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HOME IS WHERE THE NO-FAULT EVICTION 
IS: THE IMPACT OF THE DRUG WAR ON 
FAMILIES IN PUBLIC HOUSING 
Peter J. Saghir* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Congress passed the Public and Assisted Housing 
Drug Elimination Act in response to its findings that drug dealers 
were imposing a “reign of terror” on federally subsidized housing 
communities.1 In Department of Housing & Urban Development v. 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.F.A., New York University, 1994. 
The author would like to thank Marisa, Hae Jin, Jerry, and the rest of the staff of 
the Journal of Law and Policy for their hard work and guidance. He also wishes 
to thank his family for their unconditional support over the years. Special thanks 
to Alexandra, my wife, my love. 
1 Public and Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 
102 Stat. 4181 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11901-11925) (2003). See 42 U.S.C. § 
11901 (2003). The statute is congressional findings which states that: 
(1) the Federal Government has a duty to provide public and other 
federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, safe, and free 
from illegal drugs; (2) public and other federally assisted low-income 
housing in many areas suffers from rampant drug-related or violent 
crime; (3) drug dealers are increasingly imposing a reign of terror on 
public and other federally assisted low-income housing tenants; (4) 
local law enforcement authorities often lack the resources to deal with 
the drug problem in public and other federally assisted low-income 
housing, particularly in light of the recent reductions in Federal aid to 
cities; (5) closer cooperation should be encouraged between public and 
assisted housing managers, local law enforcement agencies, and 
residents in developing and implementing anti-crime programs . . . and 
(8) anti-crime strategies should be improved through the expansion of 
community-oriented policing initiatives. 
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Rucker, Chief Justice Rehnquist hijacked the language describing 
drug dealers and applied it to four tenants of the Oakland Housing 
Authority who had eviction proceedings brought against them for 
the criminal acts of third parties.2 Shockingly enough, none of 
these tenants participated in the criminal activity, and three of the 
four of them had no knowledge the criminal activity of the third 
parties was even occurring.3 
The lease governing their housing is saddled with 42 U.S.C. § 
1437d(l)(6), a statutorily mandated clause permitting the local 
housing authority to evict tenants for the criminal acts of a third 
person (“Provision”).4 And according to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the Provision permits eviction “whether or not the 
tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity.”5 While 
one might consider such a proposition outrageous and unfair, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Provision’s bright-line no-fault rule, 
holding that it was not absurd and thus not a violation of the statute 
to permit the eviction of tenants who have no knowledge of the 
                                                          
Id. 
2 535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (“With drug dealers ‘increasingly imposing a 
reign of terror on public and other federally assisted low-income housing 
tenants,’ Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.” (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 11901(3))). See infra Part I.B (discussing the facts of Rucker v. Davis). 
3 See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d 
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). The 
fourth plaintiff, Herman Walker, was a seventy-five year-old disabled man who 
required the attention of a caregiver. Id. at 1117. Mr. Walker received three 
lease violations in two months because his caregiver possessed cocaine in the 
apartment. Id. With the third violation, the housing authority instituted eviction 
proceedings against Mr. Walker despite Mr. Walker firing his caregiver. Id. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003). 
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . provide that 
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to 
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related 
criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public 
housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or 
other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination 
of tenancy. 
Id. 
5 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130. 
SAGHIR1.DOC 3/3/2004  1:52 PM 
 EVICTING THE INNOCENT 371 
criminal activity of a third party.6 
Equating and grouping innocent tenants with drug dealers is 
unfair at best.7 The excessive crime in the country’s public housing 
projects over the past thirty years has resulted in a low standard of 
living for its residents.8 While it is necessary for both our 
government and individual communities to implement solutions to 
reduce crime in public housing, the solutions and actions must be 
balanced so as not to adversely affect law-abiding tenants. Both the 
Provision and the Court’s holding in Rucker fail to adequately 
                                                          
6 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) (2003) (prohibiting public housing authorities 
from including “unreasonable terms and conditions [in their leases]”); Rucker, 
535 U.S. at 134 (finding “it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault 
evictions in order to ‘provide public and other federally assisted low-income 
housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
11901(1) (2003)). See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131 (holding that the tenant need not 
know of the drug-related criminal activity to be evicted for that drug-related 
criminal activity). The Department of Housing and Urban Development agreed 
and argued that such an interpretation was necessary. Id. at 133 n.4. Contra 
Evelyn Nieves, Drug Ruling Worries Some in Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
27, 2002, at A18; Robert Hornstein, Treena Kaye, & Daniel Atkins, Bush Public 
Housing Versus Pearlie Rucker Public Housing: One Strike for the Poor and 
How Many for the Rest of Us?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at 66 (criticizing 
the impact of the Provision on the poor). 
7 See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134 (concluding that people who cannot control 
the criminal acts of a household member are themselves a threat to the 
community); HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 51560, 51567 (Oct. 11, 1991) (“[A] family which does not or cannot 
control drug crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which 
threaten health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other residents and the 
project.”). 
8 See Otto J. Hetzel, Evolving Voices in Land Use Law: A Festschrift in 
Honor of Daniel R. Mandelker, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 415, 417 (2000) 
(characterizing public housing as “cesspools of crime and drug activity”); U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., IN THE CROSSFIRE, THE IMPACT OF GUN 
VIOLENCE ON PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 14 [hereinafter IN THE 
CROSSFIRE] (“Persons residing in public housing are over twice as likely to 
suffer from firearm-related victimization as other members of the population. 
There is a strong correlation between income and violent crime; thus the low-
income population in public housing is especially vulnerable to gun violence.”), 
at http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/crossfir.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2003). 
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balance those interests.9 Instead of protecting innocent tenants, the 
Provision and the Court’s interpretation endanger this vulnerable 
group’s health and safety by exposing them to the possibility of 
homelessness.10 Indeed, these law-abiding tenants are not only 
victims of the crime in their communities, but also of our 
government’s ill-conceived policies.11 
This note focuses on the bad public policy that will likely result 
from the Court’s strict liability interpretation of the Provision in 
Rucker.12 Part I briefly looks at the Provision itself, the Supreme 
                                                          
9 See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 129-30 (permitting the eviction of a law-abiding 
tenant even where they were unaware of criminal activity and therefore unable 
to take preventive action); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003) (permitting 
the eviction of tenants for the crimes of third parties). 
10 See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, MAYOR’S NATIONAL 
HOUSING FORUM FACT SHEET (“The shortfall in affordable housing for the very 
poorest now stands at 3.3 million units. These numbers understate the shortage 
because higher-income households occupy 65% of the units affordable to the 
poorest families.”), at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/press_releases/ 
documents/housingfactsheet_052102.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) 
[hereinafter U.S. MAYOR’S HOUSING FACT SHEET]; Judith Goldiner, Congress 
Eyes Public-Housing Decontrol (reporting median national income of public 
housing tenants is below $6,500), at http://www.tenant.net/Tengroup/ 
Metcounc/Apr96/brooke.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003). See also NATIONAL 
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, Fact Sheet #1: Why Are People Homeless? 
(Sept. 2002) (“A lack of affordable housing and the limited scale of housing 
assistance programs have contributed to the current housing crisis and to 
homelessness.”), at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/causes.html. 
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (providing for the eviction of tenants for the 
criminal acts of a third party); IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 8, at 14 (reporting 
that despite overall declining crime rates in public housing, “[p]ersons residing 
in public housing are over twice as likely to suffer from firearm-related 
victimization as other members of the population”). See also Rucker, 535 U.S. at 
127-28 (holding that a tenant may be evicted for the criminal acts of a third 
party even if  the tenant did not know or should not have known of that activity); 
infra note 70 (citing the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s “One 
Strike and You’re Out” directive articulated by President Clinton). 
12 See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130 (holding section “1437d(l)(6) 
unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities 
with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household 
members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, 
about the activity”) (emphasis added). 
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Court and Ninth Circuit’s interpretations of the Provision, and 
examples of how courts have struggled with no-fault evictions.13 
Part II defines innocent tenant and presents examples of tenants 
who have had eviction proceedings brought against them pursuant 
to the Provision or a similar clause.14 Part III focuses on the 
negative public policy the Provision creates by breaking up 
families, imposing on tenants an affirmative duty to engage in 
crime prevention and deterring recovery of people addicted to 
drugs. Additionally, Part III proposes that because an indigent 
tenant lacks meaningful choice in choosing living accommodations 
and is at a procedural disadvantage with no bargaining power when 
entering into the lease with the government for an apartment, the 
lease is arguably unconscionable. Finally, Part IV presents 
alternatives to the current strict liability policy that would ensure 
safe housing for the community while allowing individual tenants 
to feel secure in their homes and protected against arbitrary 
evictions. 
I. THE POLICY OF SECTION 1437D(1)(6) AND HUD V. RUCKER 
In response to Congressional findings that crime in public 
housing had reached intolerable proportions, Congress passed the 
Public and Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act (the “Act”) as 
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.15 The Act included a 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., Hous. Auth. of Joliet v. Chapman, 780 N.E.2d 1106 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2002) (holding that in light of Rucker, a tenant need not have knowledge of 
her son’s criminal activity or control over his actions to violate her lease). 
14 States have enacted provisions similar to section 1437d(l)(6). See, e.g., 
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 231 (McKinney 2003): 
Whenever the lessee or occupant other than the owner of any building 
or premises, shall use or occupy the same, or any part thereof, for any 
illegal trade, manufacture or other business, the lease or agreement for 
the letting or occupancy of such building or premises, or any part 
thereof shall thereupon become void, and the landlord of such lessee or 
occupant may enter upon the premises so let or occupied. 
Id. 
15 See supra note 1 (discussing Congressional findings); Public and 
Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 
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provision requiring public housing authorities to issue leases that 
provide for the termination of a tenant’s lease if the tenant, a 
member of the tenant’s household or guest engages in any criminal 
activity that threatens the peace and enjoyment of the premises by 
other tenants.16 In applying this provision, some courts have used a 
strict liability standard for eviction while others have required a 
showing that the tenant knew or should have known of the criminal 
activity to warrant eviction.17 The Ninth Circuit in Rucker v. Davis 
held that “Congress did not intend § 1437d(l)(6) to permit the 
eviction of innocent tenants.”18 The Supreme Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit and held that the local housing authorities have “the 
discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the 
household or a guest engages in drug-related activity, regardless of 
whether the tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-
related activity.”19 Since the Court’s holding in Rucker, courts 
                                                          
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11901-11925) (2003). 
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). 
17 See Hous. Auth. of New Orleans v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552, 552 (La. Ct. 
App. 1995) (“The question in this case is whether a Housing Authority of New 
Orleans [] tenant may be evicted because a guest in her apartment had illegal 
drugs without her knowledge. The answer is yes.”); Ann Arbor Hous. Comm’n 
v. Wells, 618 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]e hold that a public 
housing tenancy may be terminated . . . regardless of whether the tenant had 
knowledge of the drug-related activity conducted on or off the premises by the 
tenant, a member of the tenant’s household, or a guest or another person under 
the tenant’s control.”). But see Kimball Hill Mgmt. v. Roper, 733 N.E.2d 458, 
465 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (requiring “tenant have some minimum connection with 
the criminal activity before she can be evicted”); Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. 
Patterson, 464 S.E.2d 68, 72 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding “good cause for 
eviction does not exist when a public housing tenant is not personally at fault for 
a breach of the criminal activity termination provision of a public housing lease 
by a member of the tenant’s household”); Delaware County Hous. Auth. v. 
Bishop, 749 A.2d 997, 1002 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (“[W]e refuse to hold a 
tenant strictly liable for unforeseeable criminal acts committed, without the 
tenant’s knowledge, by family members who are not under the tenant’s 
control.”). 
18 Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d 
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
19 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 136. 
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have been forced to rethink their approaches to no-fault evictions.20 
A. The Provision 
The Public and Assisted Housing Drug Elimination Act 
provides that: 
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . 
provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, 
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by 
other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off 
such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any 
member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other 
person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for 
termination of tenancy.21 
The Act was passed at a time when drugs and violence plagued 
public housing and local law enforcement lacked the resources to 
bring the dangers of these crimes under control.22 It provides 
grants to local housing authorities to implement measures to 
minimize the negative impact of drugs and crime on their 
communities.23 In past years, program grants have been used to 
                                                          
20 See Hous. Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh v. Fields, 816 A.2d 1099 (Pa. 
2003) (reversing a lower court’s holding that the tenant could not be evicted 
under section 1437d(l)(6) where her son was not under her control in light of 
“the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Department of Housing and 
Urban Development v. Rucker”). See also infra Part I.C (citing two courts 
confronted with the change since the Court’s decision in Rucker). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). 
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 11901(2) (2003) (finding “public and other federally 
assisted low-income housing in many areas suffers from rampant drug-related or 
violent crime”); see also id. § 11901(5) (finding “local law enforcement 
authorities often lack the resources to deal with the drug problem in public and 
other federally assisted low-income housing, particularly in light of the recent 
reductions in Federal aid to cities”). 
23 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11901-11925 (creating the Public and Assisted 
Housing Drug Elimination Act); 42 U.S.C § 11903(a). Providing funds to public 
housing and other low income housing projects for: 
(1) the employment of security personnel; (2) reimbursement of local 
law enforcement agencies for additional security and protective 
services; . . . (5) the provision of training, communications equipment, 
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employ security personnel, develop programs to reduce and 
eliminate the use of drugs (including Youth Sports activities), 
make physical changes to improve security and train and equip 
voluntary tenant patrols.24 While the program has contributed to a 
reduction in overall rates of crime, gun violence still remains a 
severe problem.25 
B. HUD v. Rucker 
In HUD v. Rucker, the Supreme Court interpreted and applied 
section 1437d(l)(6) to four elderly tenants of the Oakland Housing 
Authority who were threatened with eviction because of the 
criminal acts of other household family members or guests.26 
Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court held 
                                                          
and other related equipment for use by voluntary tenant patrols acting 
in cooperation with local law enforcement officials; (6) programs 
designed to reduce use of drugs in and around public or other federally 
assisted low-income housing projects, including drug-abuse prevention, 
intervention, referral, and treatment programs . . . . 
Id. See also Jim Moye, Can’t Stop the Hustle: The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s “One Strike” Eviction Policy Fails to Get Drugs Out of 
America’s Projects, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 281-82 (2003) (discussing 
the new funding and programs instituted under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988). 
24 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Drug Elimination 
in Public and Assisted Housing, at http://www.hud.gov/nofa/suprnofa/ 
sprprt4g.cfm (content updated Dec. 5, 2000). 
25 Living in Projects Raises the Risk of Being Shot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2000, at 16 (discussing a report issued by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development showing that while gun violence has increased, overall levels of 
crime are falling in public housing projects); see IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 
8, at 2 (“An analysis of detailed crime-trend data for 55 public housing 
authorities . . . found that the crime rate declined in two-thirds of the authorities 
(37 of the 55) between 1994 and 1997.”). But see id. at 14 (“The annual rate of 
victimization between 1995 and 1997 for residents of public housing was 10 per 
1,000 persons. The rate for persons not in public housing was 4 per 1,000.”). 
26 See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128 (2002); 
see also Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d 
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (noting 
the plaintiffs’ ages: 63, 63, 71, and 75). 
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that these tenants could be evicted pursuant to the Provision, 
regardless of whether or not they knew or should have known of 
the criminal acts.27 The policy and application of the Provision is 
best understood with an appreciation for the distinctions between 
the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
Provision. 
1. The Tenants 
The four plaintiffs in Rucker were tenants of the Oakland 
Housing Authority: Pearlie Rucker, 63, Willie Lee, 71, Barbara 
Hill, 63, and Herman Walker, 75.28 Ms. Rucker, a resident of 
public housing for sixteen years, had eviction proceedings brought 
against her after her mentally disabled daughter was found 
possessing cocaine several blocks from their home.29 The eviction 
proceeding against Ms. Rucker was initiated despite routine 
searches she made of her daughter’s room that came up negative 
for drugs.30 Willie Lee, who lived in the public housing complex 
for twenty-five years, and Barbara Hill, who lived in the public 
housing complex for more than thirty years, had eviction 
proceedings initiated against them after their grandsons were found 
smoking marijuana in the parking lot of the housing complex.31 
Neither Ms. Lee nor Ms. Hill was aware of their grandsons’ drug 
use.32 The final plaintiff, Herman Walker, a partially paralyzed 
former minister, had lived in public housing for eight years.33 The 
                                                          
27 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 127-28. 
28 Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *5-7 
(N.D. Cal. June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 
237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
29 Id. at *6. 
30 Id.; Kara Platoni, Collateral Damage from the Drug War: Elderly OHA 
Tenants Hope the Supreme Court Will Allow Them to Stay in their Homes, EAST 
BAY EXPRESS (California), Oct. 17, 2001. 
31 Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *6-7; Platoni, supra note 30. 
32 Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *7. 
33 Id. at *6; Emelyn Cruz Lat, One Strike Evictions: First of Two Parts, 
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Aug. 23, 1998, at A-10. 
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Oakland Housing Authority instituted eviction proceedings against 
Mr. Walker when his caregiver was found with cocaine in his 
apartment.34 Even though he fired the caretaker upon being told 
that he was being evicted for her criminal conduct, the building 
manager told him it was too late and the housing authority would 
file suit anyway.35 
2.  The Ninth Circuit’s Approach 
In Rucker, the Ninth Circuit found that the Provision “is not a 
picture of clarity and may be subject to varying interpretations.”36 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute does not “expressly 
address the level of personal knowledge or fault that is required for 
eviction, or even make it clear who can be evicted.”37 Because of 
the ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit looked to the overall statutory 
scheme and noted that Congress has placed a number of 
restrictions on the ability of local housing authorities to evict 
tenants.38 
                                                          
34 Mr. Walker’s caregiver was found possessing cocaine in Mr. Walker’s 
apartment in three instances within two months. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 
1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev. v. Rucker, 533 U.S. 125 (2002). After a stroke left him paralyzed, Mr. 
Walker hired a health care aide to assist him with cooking and bathing. Hard 
Line in Public Housing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at 14. Mr. Walker, at the 
time of hiring the aide, was unaware she was a cocaine user or that she hid drugs 
and a crack pipe in Walker’s apartment. Id. She was caught possessing the drugs 
during a security check of the building. Id. 
35 Cruz Lat, supra note 33 (“Walker recalls the manager telling him, ‘We’ll 
file suit and you won’t stand a chance. We win 98 percent of our cases.’”). 
36 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1123. The Ninth Circuit held that HUD’s 
interpretation permitting the eviction of innocent tenants is inconsistent with 
congressional intent and must be rejected under the first step of Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Rucker, 
237 F.3d at 1119. In Chevron, the court held that an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute should not be deferred to where Congress has spoken on the issue and the 
agency’s interpretation is contrary to congressional intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
842-43. 
37 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1120. 
38 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) prohibiting leases with unreasonable 
terms and conditions and § 1437d(l)(5) forbidding housing authorities from 
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The court also considered the civil forfeiture provision of the 
Controlled Substances Act, which appears in the same chapter and 
subtitle of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and is part of a single 
legislative scheme to combat drug abuse in public housing.39 The 
Controlled Substances Act provided for an innocent owner defense 
and recognized an innocent owner as one who either did not know 
of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, or did all that could 
reasonably be expected under the circumstances to terminate such 
criminal conduct.40 The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development argued to the court that the innocent owner defense 
applied only to civil forfeitures, not lease eviction proceedings, and 
that because they were two different statutes, the innocent owner 
defense was inapplicable to the Provision.41 The Ninth Circuit was 
unpersuaded and reasoned that although the statutes were different, 
they govern the same subject matter, were enacted at the same time 
in the same chapter of the same Act and thus, it was fair to 
presume the Congress meant them to be read together.42 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development also put 
forth a negative implication argument.43 It argued that Congress’s 
amendment of the civil forfeiture provision of the Controlled 
Substances Act to include an innocent tenant defense, when 
considered with Congress’s failure to write such a defense into the 
Provision, indicates they did not intend for one to be available 
                                                          
terminating tenancies except for “serious or repeated violation of the terms or 
conditions of the lease or for other good cause”). 
39 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2003); Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1121. “The ‘innocent 
owner’ defense which then appeared in 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) is now codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 983(d) as part of the general rules for civil forfeiture procedures.” 
Id. at 1121 n.1. 
40 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2003). An innocent owner is one who “(i) did not 
know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture; or (ii) upon learning of the conduct 
giving rise to the forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under the 
circumstances to terminate such use of the property.” Id. at § 983(d)(2). 
41 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1121-22. 
42 Id. at 1122 (“When dealing with two different statutes which not only 
govern the same subject matter but were also enacted at the same time in the 
same chapter of the same Act, we presume Congress meant them to be read 
consistently.”). 
43 Id. 
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under the Provision.44 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument 
because the civil forfeiture amendment and section 1437d(l)(6) 
were drafted by different Congresses and “[t]o say Congress could 
have drafted the defense more explicitly in § 1437d(l)(6) is not to 
say it did not do so at all.”45 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
innocent tenant defense provided in the Controlled Substances Act 
indicated that Congress intended for the Provision to apply to 
innocent tenants under section 1437d(l)(6).46 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Provision 
led to absurd results and stated that the court should not assume 
that Congress intended absurd results in passing a law.47 The 
                                                          
44 See id. The civil forfeiture provision states: 
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States . . . . All 
real property, including any right, title and interest (including any 
leasehold interest) . . . which is used, or intended to be used, in any 
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a 
violation of this subchapter . . . except that no property shall be 
forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, 
by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been 
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner. 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). The innocent owner defense in 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) is 
now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(d). 
45 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1122. 
46 Id. at 1123. 
47 Id. at 1119, citing United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 69 
(1994). In X-Citement Video, the owner and operator of X-Citement Video was 
convicted for shipping 49 videotapes of Traci Lords performing in pornographic 
films before she was 18. Id. at 66. The Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act of 1977 makes it a criminal act to knowingly transport, ship, 
receive or distribute a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct. Id. at 67-68; see 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2003). The issue before the Court 
was whether the term “knowingly” applied only to the transport of the material 
or to both the transport of the materials and the sexually explicit nature of the 
materials. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69. The Ninth Circuit held that the 
term “knowingly” applied only to the transport elements and the statute was 
unconstitutional because it lacked a scienter requirement relating to the sexually 
explicit nature of the materials. Id. at 67-68. The Supreme Court reversed and 
held that the term knowingly applies to both the transport and explicit nature of 
the materials. Id. at 69-70, 78. Otherwise, the Court noted, the statute would 
“produce results that were not merely odd, but positively absurd.” Id. at 70. As 
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absurd results are illustrated by the cases that were before the 
court.48 Ms. Rucker took steps to stop her daughter’s drug abuse, 
yet still had eviction proceedings brought against her.49 
Additionally, Ms. Lee and Ms. Hill had eviction proceedings 
instituted against them when their grandchildren were found 
smoking marijuana in the parking lot, an act that can hardly be 
considered a serious offense.50 Evicting such innocent tenants 
                                                          
an example, the Court explained that under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, “a 
retail druggist who returns an uninspected roll of developed film to a customer 
‘knowingly distributes’ a visual depiction and would be criminally liable if it 
were later discovered that the visual depiction contained images of children 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” Id. at 69. The Court concluded: “We do 
not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such results.” Id. See infra 
text accompanying notes 81-86 (citing examples of absurd evictions). 
48 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1124 (“We need look no further than the facts of this 
case for an example of the odd and unjust results that arise under HUD’s 
interpretation.”); see infra note 78 (criticizing the lack of geographical limits in 
applying the statute); see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the plaintiffs’ in 
Rucker). 
49 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1124 (“HUD conceded at oral argument that there 
was nothing more Pearlie Rucker could have done to protect herself from 
eviction, but argued that the statute authorized her eviction nonetheless.”). 
50 See id. at 1117 (“[The Oakland Housing Authority] sought to evict Lee 
and Hill because their grandsons were caught smoking marijuana together in the 
apartment complex parking lot.”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) 
(West 2003) (“Except as authorized by law, every person who possesses not 
more than 28.5 grams of marijuana, other than concentrated cannabis, is guilty 
of a msisdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred 
dollars ($100).”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2003) (“Unlawful 
possession of mari[j]uana is a violation punishable only by a fine of not more 
than one hundred dollars.”). See also NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE 
REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS, Personal Use 1, at http://www.norml.org/pdf_ 
files/NORML_personal_use_introduction .pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2003). 
Since 1973, 12 state legislatures—Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio and Oregon—have enacted versions of marijuana 
decriminalization. In each of these states, marijuana users no longer 
face jail time (nor in most cases, arrest or criminal records) for the 
possession or use of small amounts of marijuana. 
Id.; Clifford Krauss, Chretien Leaves at Ease, Even If Bush Is Displeased, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at A3 (“I don’t think a kid of 17 years old who has a joint 
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undermines any incentive there could have been to take action 
against the wrongdoing.51 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted potential Due Process concerns 
in that the tenant’s interest in the home was taken even where the 
tenant’s home was not connected to the criminal act.52 The 
                                                          
should have a criminal record,” (quoting Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien 
discussing liberalizing drug laws)); James C. McKinley Jr., Signs of a Drug War 
Thaw; As Fear Eases, Rockefeller Laws Seem Less Necessary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
21, 2001, at 29 Metropolitan Desk (“In 1977, President Carter formally 
advocated legalizing marijuana in amounts up to an ounce.”); Sam Howe 
Verhovek, Alaska’s Voters to Decide On Legalizing Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 10, 2000, at A18 (discussing Alaskans’ vote on Proposition 5 which would 
legalize marijuana consumption for anyone over 18). 
51 See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002) 
(reasoning that the strict liability inherent in “no-fault” evictions maximizes 
deterrence). It could be argued, however, that not evicting tenants who take 
steps to stop criminal activity would maximize deterrence, as the tenants may 
more readily get involved if they know it will save them from eviction. Evicting 
innocent tenants even where they took action to stop the prohibited conduct (as 
did Pearlie Rucker in searching her daughter’s room and warning her of the 
possibility of eviction, Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117) creates a disincentive for 
tenants to get involved for they will have nothing to gain by doing so. Thus, 
prohibiting their eviction where they take action creates an incentive to get 
involved and maximizes deterrence. Additionally, absurd results would be less 
likely, and the Provision more reasonable, if the housing authorities were 
obligated to consider all circumstances relevant to a particular case before 
evicting the tenant. See HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 
24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003) (stating that in considering whether to evict, the 
housing authorities “may consider all circumstances relevant to a particular 
case” as opposed to shall consider the relevant circumstances) (emphasis 
added). Among the circumstances that may be considered are the “seriousness of 
the offending action,” “extent of participation by the leaseholder in the 
offending action,” and “the effects that the eviction would have on family 
members not involved in the offending activity.” Id. See infra Part IV 
(discussing alternatives to the harsh no-fault eviction standard). 
52 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1125 (“HUD’s interpretation of § 1437d(l)(6), which 
would permit the deprivation of a tenant’s property interest when the property 
was not used in the commission of a crime and when the tenant did not know of 
the illegal activity, would raise serious due process questions.”). See Nelson H. 
Mock, Note, Punishing the Innocent: No-Fault Eviction of Public Housing 
Tenants for the Actions of Third Parties, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1495, 1522-23 (1998) 
(explaining that to establish a substantive due process claim, a tenant must show 
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Department of Housing and Urban Development argued that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bennis v. Michigan53 disposed of any 
due process concerns because Bennis held that depriving an 
innocent owner of a property right does not violate due process.54 
Central to the Bennis Court’s holding, however, was the fact that 
the property was used in connection with the criminal activity.55 
Contrarily, in Rucker, the leased premises were not used in 
connection with the crime.56 Although the Ninth Circuit found that 
the evictions “raise serious due process questions,” it did not reach 
                                                          
the housing authority, a state actor, “(1) deprived the tenant of property (2) for 
‘an irrational or invidious purpose’” (quoting Long Grove Country Club Estates, 
Inc. v. Long Grove, 693 F. Supp. 640, 657 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). 
53 516 U.S. 442 (1996). 
54 In Bennis, the Court upheld the forfeiture of a car, id. at 453, against a 
wife’s due process claim, where the car, which was jointly owned with the 
husband, was forfeited as a public nuisance, id. at 446, when the husband used it 
to engage in sexual activity with a prostitute, id. at 443. In Rucker, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that the tenants had a property interest in their homes under 
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451 (1982). Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1125. In 
Greene, the Court held that public housing tenants had a property interest and 
were deprived of that interest when they were not given adequate notice before 
final eviction proceedings were instituted against them. Greene, 456 U.S. at 456. 
55 See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453. “[A] long and unbroken line of cases holds 
that an owner’s interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to 
which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be 
put to such use.” Id. at 446. “The Bennis automobile, it is conceded, facilitated 
and was used in criminal activity.” Id. at 453. See also id. at 455 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (stressing that in the case of an innocent owner and civil forfeiture, 
courts should strictly apply “historical standards for determining whether 
specific property is an ‘instrumentality’ of crime” before the property is 
forfeited). 
56 Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *6-7 
(N.D. Cal. June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 
237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (finding Rucker’s daughter was 
three blocks from their apartment and Lee and Hill’s grandsons possessed 
marijuana in a parking lot of the housing complex). Herman Walker is an 
exception in that his premise was used in connection with the criminal activity 
because his caregiver, upon whom he was dependent, brought cocaine into the 
apartment. Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117. 
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that issue.57 Instead, the court held “that if a tenant has taken 
reasonable steps to prevent criminal drug activity from occurring, 
but, for a lack of knowledge or other reason, could not realistically 
exercise control over the conduct of a household member or guest, 
§ 1437d(l)(6) does not authorize the eviction of such a tenant.”58 
3. The Supreme Court’s Approach 
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s concerns over the enforcement of 
section 1437d(l)(6) against innocent tenants, the Supreme Court 
reversed, unanimously holding that the Provision “unambiguously 
requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with 
the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of 
household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or 
should have known, about the activity.”59 The Court found that a 
plain reading of the statute would not lead to absurd results, there 
was no need to consult legislative history, and the statute does not 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 
The Court grounded its holding in the plain language of the 
statute, which provides that: “any drug-related criminal activity on 
or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any 
member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person 
under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of 
tenancy.”61 The Court reasoned that Congress’s decision not to 
impose any knowledge qualification in the statute, “combined with 
its use of the term ‘any’ to modify ‘drug-related criminal activity,’ 
                                                          
57 Id. at 1125-26. “It is also a settled principle of statutory interpretation 
that whenever possible, a statute should be construed to avoid substantial 
constitutional concerns.” Id. at 1124. 
58 Id. at 1126. In reaching it’s holding, the court construed the term 
“control” as “a limitation on the breadth of the [P]rovision.” Id. The Provision 
states in relevant part: “any drug-related criminal activity on or off such 
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s 
household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause 
for termination of tenancy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003). 
59 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130. 
60 Id. at 132-33, 135. 
61 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6); Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130. 
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precludes any knowledge requirement.”62 In addition, the Court 
found it important that under the statute, any drug related activity 
is grounds for termination, “not just drug-related activity the tenant 
knew, or should have known, about.”63 Because the Court found 
the statute unambiguous, the Court did not consult the legislative 
history.64 
Not only did the Supreme Court find the statute unambiguous, 
but it also found it reasonable and not a violation of section 
1437d(l)(2), which prohibits public housing authorities from 
including “unreasonable terms and conditions [in their leases].”65 
While one might conclude that evicting a tenant for something they 
did not do is unreasonable and, thus, a violation of section 
1437d(l)(2), the Court found the statute reasonable because it does 
not require the eviction of the tenant.66 Instead, the Court found, it 
vests in the local housing authority the decision to evict based on 
“the seriousness of the offending action,” and “the extent to which 
the leaseholder has . . . taken all reasonable steps to prevent or 
                                                          
62 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130-31 (citing United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 
600, 609 (1989)); 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). 
63 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131; 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). 
64 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133. Had the Court consulted the legislative history 
of section 1437d(l)(6), the Court would have found a Senate Report expressly 
speaking to the issue of knowledge. See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1123 
(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. 
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (finding no House or Senate reports accompanied 
the original version of § 1437d(l)(6), but finding Senate Report issued when the 
Provision was amended in 1990). That Senate Report states: 
The committee anticipates that each case will be judged on its 
individual merits and will require the wise exercise of humane 
judgment by the PHA and the eviction court. For example, eviction 
would not be the appropriate course if the tenant had no knowledge of 
the criminal activities of his/her guests or had taken reasonable steps 
under the circumstances to prevent the activity. 
S. REP. NO. 101-316, at 179 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5763, 5941. 
65 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34 n.5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) (2003) 
(“Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . do not contain 
unreasonable terms and conditions.”). 
66 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133. 
SAGHIR1.DOC 3/3/2004  1:52 PM 
386 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
mitigate the offending action.”67 That discretion, the Court 
concluded, makes the Provision reasonable and, thus, not a 
violation of section 1437d(l)(2).68 Finally, the Court dismissed any 
Due Process concerns because tenants receive notices of eviction 
and are given the opportunity in the eviction proceedings to dispute 
whether the lease provision was actually violated.69 
C. The Influence of Rucker on Courts Struggling with No-
Fault Evictions 
Prior to HUD v. Rucker, both state and federal courts were split 
over whether Congress intended this “zero tolerance” policy.70 
Since Rucker, courts have been forced to rethink their approaches 
                                                          
67 Id. at 134. See HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 
C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003). 
68 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133-34. 
69 Id. at 136. 
70 Compare Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504, 512-13 
(Tenn. 2001) (prohibiting the eviction of innocent tenants from federally 
subsidized housing), with Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 591 N.W.2d 
700, 701 (Minn. 1999) (permitting landlords to evict tenants in federally 
subsidized housing who are unaware of criminality); compare Rucker v. Davis, 
237 F.3d 1113, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (prohibiting innocent tenants from 
being evicted) with Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (permitting federally subsidized landlords to evict tenants despite 
tenants’ having no knowledge of criminality). The zero tolerance policy was 
articulated by President Clinton as the “One Strike and You’re Out” policy. See 
United States Department of Housing & Urban Development Directive No. 96-
16, Notice PIH 96-16 (HA) (issued Apr. 12, 1996) (discussing the “One Strike 
and You’re Out” policy announced by President Clinton on March 28, 1996, 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/ publications/notices/96/pih96-16.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2003)). The “One Strike and You’re Out” provision “requires 
public housing authorities to implement strong tenant screening, admissions, and 
evictions rules that mandate exclusion from public housing and lease 
termination for persons who engage in criminal activity, including drug-related 
activity.” IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 8, at 13 (discussing the zero tolerance 
“One Strike and You’re Out” policy requiring “public housing authorities to 
implement strong tenant screening, admissions, and evictions rules that mandate 
exclusion from public housing and lease termination for persons who engage in 
criminal activity, including drug-related activity”). 
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to no-fault evictions.71 For instance, before Rucker, in Housing 
Authority of Joliet v. Keys, Illinois’s Appellate Division held that 
“where a tenant could not realistically exercise control over the 
conduct of a household member or guest due to lack of knowledge 
or some other reason, section 1437d(l)(6) [did] not authorize the 
eviction of that tenant.”72 However, in the wake of Rucker, the 
same court held that according to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Provision, local public housing authorities 
have discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member 
of the household or a guest causes a violation of the lease by 
engaging in drug related criminal activity, “regardless of whether 
the tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-related 
activity.”73 
Similarly, before Rucker, New Jersey recognized an “innocent 
lessee exception” to eviction proceedings commenced for a third-
party’s criminal activity.74 In Oakwood Plaza Apartments v. Smith, 
                                                          
71 See Hous. Auth. of Joliet v. Chapman, 780 N.E.2d 1106, 1107-08 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2002); Hous. Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh v. Fields, 816 A.2d 1099 
(Pa. 2003) (reversing a lower court’s holding that the tenant could not be evicted 
under section 1437d(l)(6) where her son was not under her control in light of 
“the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Department of Housing and 
Urban Development v. Rucker”). 
72 Hous. Auth. of Joliet, 761 N.E.2d at 344. In Housing Authority of Joliet, 
the local housing authority brought an action to evict Patricia Keys from her 
home when her adult grandson confessed to robbing and shooting an individual 
at Keys’ residence. Id. at 340. Keys was a patient in the hospital when the crime 
occurred. Id. Nonetheless, one month later the housing authority served Ms. 
Keys with a notice to terminate her tenancy. Id. The court found that Ms. Keys, 
described by the trial court as “an elderly woman in a walker, [whose] court 
appearances had to be scheduled consistent with her appointments for dialysis,” 
did not have control over her adult grandson. Id. at 344 (citation omitted). The 
court affirmed the trial court’s holding that “a tenant ‘without notice and without 
control over guests or family members cannot lose his or her lease hold [sic] 
interest in the property.’” Id. at 340. 
73 Id. at 344. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation in Rucker). 
74 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1–61.12 (West 2003): 
No lessee or tenant . . . may be removed by the Superior Court from 
any house . . . except upon establishment of one of the following 
grounds as good cause . . . the tenant or lessee of such leased premises, 
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New Jersey’s Appellate Division held that to justify eviction—the 
“ultimate sanction”—a court must find the tenant permitted the 
guest to be in the apartment, and the tenant knew the guest was 
violating the state drug laws.75 The court specifically recognized 
that to hold otherwise would run contrary to the remedial purpose 
of the act—to “address [a] critical shortage of residential housing 
and to prevent ‘the dispossession of tenants who are paying their 
rent and generally complying with their obligations as tenants.’”76 
After Rucker, New Jersey’s innocent lessee exception was severely 
weakened, for the New Jersey courts were free to uphold evictions 
of tenants unaware of the criminal activity of a household guest or 
member.77 
II. MEET THE INNOCENT TENANT 
The Provision fails in large part due to its broad reach.78 To 
                                                          
knowingly harbors or harbored therein a person who committed such an 
offense [i.e., use, possession, manufacture, dispensing or distribution of 
an illegal narcotic], or otherwise permits or permitted such a person to 
occupy those premises for residential purposes . . . . 
Id. at § 2A:18-61.1(p) (emphasis added). 
75 Oakwood Plaza Apartments v. Smith, 800 A.2d 265, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002), quoting Hous. Auth. of Hoboken v. Alicea, 688 A.2d 108, 110 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1997) (characterizing eviction from public housing as 
the “ultimate sanction”). In Alicea, the court held that a tenant must not only 
“‘permit’ a drug offender to occupy the leased premises, but must also tolerate 
the offender’s occupancy of the premises knowing that such person has violated 
the [Comprehensive Drug Reform Act].” Alicea, 688 A.2d at 110. 
76 Alicea, 688 A.2d at 110. 
77 See Oakwood Plaza Apartments, 800 A.2d at 267. Instead the court 
emphasized the Supreme Court’s recognition that various factors should be 
evaluated when deciding whether to evict. Id. at 268. The factors are: the 
seriousness of the violation, the effect of the eviction on the household members 
not involved in the criminal activity, and the willingness to remove the 
wrongdoing household member from the lease as a condition for continued 
occupancy. Id. at 268. 
78 See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), 
rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) 
(criticizing the lack of geographical limits in applying the statute). The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development acknowledged “the statute 
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illustrate this point, it is important to understand who is subject to 
liability under the Provision. Not only is the person accused of 
committing the crime subject to eviction for their criminal acts, but 
so also is the tenant of record, who may be unconnected to and 
lack any knowledge about the criminal activity.79 This person is 
often referred to as the innocent tenant whom the Ninth Circuit 
described as a tenant who “did not know of or have any reason to 
know of such activity or took all reasonable steps to prevent the 
activity from occurring.”80 
These innocent low-income public housing tenants are 
exceptional victims of their circumstances: Not only do they have 
high rates of crime, including violent crime, to fear, but the threat 
of homelessness as well.81 The innocent tenant is Rosario Albino, a 
                                                          
would apply and permit eviction of an entire family if a tenant’s child was 
visiting friends on the other side of the country and was caught smoking 
marijuana, even if the parents had no idea the child had ever engaged in such 
activity and even if they had no realistic way to control their child’s actions 
3,000 miles away.” Id. 
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003). “[A]ny drug-related criminal activity 
on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of 
the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, 
shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” Id.; see also Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) (holding “any drug-related activity 
engaged in by the specified persons is grounds for termination, not just drug-
related activity that the tenant knew, or should have known, about”). 
80 See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1115-16; see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2) (2003) 
(stating that an innocent owner is one who “(i) did not know of the conduct 
giving rise to forfeiture; or (ii) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the 
forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to 
terminate such use of the property”). In Rucker, Rucker did not know of her 
granddaughter’s drug use, regularly searched her room for evidence of drug use, 
and warned her and others that drug use on the premises could result in eviction. 
Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 237 F.3d 
1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. 
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). Similarly, Lee and Hill were not aware of any 
prior illegal drug activity by their grandsons and warned them that such 
prohibited conduct could result in eviction. Id. at *7. 
81 See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1115. The Ninth Circuit stated: 
Many of our nation’s poor live in public housing projects that, by many 
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sixty-eight year-old widowed mother of eight with a total monthly 
fixed income of $411.82 The court found her only fault was “in 
raising two daughters who went astray and got involved in 
narcotics.”83 The innocent tenant is Ms. Green, “an exemplary 
tenant of the housing complex” and “volunteer on the Resident 
Council Board for the complex” who was evicted from her 
apartment when her daughter’s friend secretly brought drugs into 
the home.84 And finally, the innocent tenant is Teri Wells, who was 
evicted from her home where she and her children had lived for 
nine years when her brother, who was staying with her on a 
temporary basis after living in a homeless shelter, was found 
selling narcotics in the vicinity of her home.85 That she had no 
knowledge of the activity and asked her brother to leave upon his 
arrest was not enough to keep the housing authority from evicting 
her.86 
Eviction proceedings do not necessarily result in evictions, 
though.87 In the case of the respondents in Rucker, for instance, the 
                                                          
accounts, are little more than illegal drug markets and war zones. 
Innocent tenants live barricaded behind doors, in fear for their safety 
and the safety of their children. What these tenants may not realize is 
that, under existing policies of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development [], they should add another fear to their list: becoming 
homeless . . . . 
Id. See also HUD USER, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., Gun-Related 
Violence: The Costs to Public Housing Communities (“In 1998 there were an 
estimated 360 gun-related homicides in 66 of the Nation’s 100 largest public 
housing authorities.”), at http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/rrr/rrr_3_2000/ 
0300_1.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003); NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE 
HOMELESS, Fact Sheet #1: Why Are People Homeless? (Sept. 2002) (“Two 
trends are largely responsible for the rise in homelessness over the past 20-25 
years: a growing shortage of affordable rental housing and a simultaneous 
increase in poverty.”), at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/causes. html. 
82 Lloyd Realty Corp. v. Albino, 552 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 
1990). 
83 Id. at 1011. 
84 Hous. Auth. v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
85 Ann Arbor Hous. Comm’n v. Wells, 618 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Mich. 2000). 
86 Id. at 44-45. 
87 See, e.g., infra note 89 (citing cases that did not result in eviction). While 
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Oakland Housing Authority dismissed the eviction proceedings 
against three of the four tenants.88 Additionally, in New York, 
several eviction proceedings have been dismissed at the trial 
level;89 however, some are not overturned until appealed. In Brown 
                                                          
no-fault evictions might be vacated on appeal, certainly not all are vacated and 
even where they are, the family has nonetheless been put in a dangerous position 
bordering on homelessness. See, e.g., Lloyd Realty Corp., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 1009 
(acknowledging the merits of a narcotics eviction program, but also recognizing 
“concern regarding evictions from residential premises of innocent family 
members including those who are senior citizens, disabled tenants and tenants 
with infant children, especially in light of the present acute housing shortage”). 
88 Lakiesha McGhee, 2 of 4 ‘Evicted’ Oakland Tenants Can Stay, 
OAKLAND TRIB., Apr. 5, 2002, at Front Page (reporting that one week after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rucker, the Oakland Housing Authority dropped 
eviction proceedings against Lee and Hill). The case against Rucker was 
dismissed in 1998. Id. The Oakland Housing Authority is still reviewing the case 
against Herman Walker. OAKLAND HOUSING AUTHORITY, OHA Reviews Cases 
(Apr. 4, 2002), at http://www.oakha.org/rucker.html. 
89 See, e.g., Lloyd Realty Corp., 552 N.Y.S.2d at 1008. In Lloyd Realty 
Corp., petitioner landlord sought to recover possession of the tenant’s premises 
after a “buy and bust” operation resulted in the arrest of the tenant’s daughter 
and daughter’s friend for selling narcotics in front of the subject premises. Id. at 
1009. Rosario Albino, the tenant, lived in the apartment for fifteen years. Id. She 
was sixty-eight, widowed, suffered from hypertension and bronchial asthma, had 
no knowledge of the drug activity, and received a total monthly income of $411 
from Social Security Widow’s Pension and Supplemental Security Income. Id. 
at 1009, 1011. The court reasoned that to uphold such an eviction, it must be 
shown that Mrs. Albino knew of the illegal drug activity and thus acquiesced in 
the use of the premises for such purposes. Id. at 1010. The court did not find that 
the evidence supported such a finding. Id. Additionally, the court found that 
“that the eviction of a senior citizen who has no knowledge nor involvement of 
the illegal drug activity conducted in her apartment will [not] further serve the 
purpose of the narcotics eviction program. Id. See, e.g., 1895 Grand Concourse 
Assocs. v. Ramos, 685 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1998). In 1895 
Grand Concourse, the landlord sought to recover possession of the respondent 
tenant’s premises alleging respondent has been using the premises for the illegal 
the sale of drugs. Id. Tenant, Theresa Ramos, resided in the apartment for the 
last twenty-five years with her seven children and husband. Id. at 582. She was 
never arrested prior to the charges underlying this case and those charges against 
her were dismissed. Id. She did not sell nor did she consume drugs. The landlord 
sought recovery when a search of the premises resulted in the police finding 
cocaine. Id. at 581. A detective involved in the search testified that the search 
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v. Popolizio, for example, Rachel Brown’s tenancy was terminated 
when her son, who had not lived with her for six months, was 
arrested on housing grounds for possession of a controlled 
substance in the seventh degree, a Class A misdemeanor.90 The 
possession was his first arrest, and he pled to disorderly conduct, a 
violation.91 Ms. Brown had lived in the same apartment for nearly 
twenty years and at the time of the eviction proceedings resided 
there with her twin minor daughters, another son and his family.92 
The Appellate Division vacated the housing authority’s decision as 
contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.93 The court noted 
that the housing authority’s management manual did not authorize 
termination of tenancy for misdemeanor non-desirable acts, such 
as the one here, unless there are other factors of an undesirable 
nature on the tenant’s record.94 The court found that Ms. Brown’s 
record contained no complaint of any kind during her twenty-year 
tenancy.95 Thus, the court found the hearing officer’s 
determination “arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and the 
penalty imposed constituted an abuse of discretion.”96 
In Robinson v. Martinez, Tawana Robinson had eviction 
proceedings brought against her when she violated a stipulation 
she entered into with the housing authority to exclude her son from 
                                                          
did neither indicate any sale of narcotics from the premises nor any information 
that drugs were being sold in the apartment. Id. at 581-82. Ms. Ramos’s husband 
also credibly testified that he was using the cocaine for his personal 
consumption and that no one in his family knew about his consumption. Id. at 
582. The court dismissed the landlord’s action to recover the premises because 
no evidence was presented indicating that narcotics were sold from the premises 
and no evidence was presented showing that Ms. Ramos knew or should have 
known of her husband’s drug use. Id. at 583. 
90 569 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
220.02 (McKinney 2003). A class A misdemeanor is punishable by a fine of up 
to $1,000. Id. at § 80.05. 
91 Brown, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 617, 622. 
92 Id. at 617. 
93 Id. at 622. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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the premises.97 The housing authority instituted termination 
proceedings after she permitted her son, who was seriously ill, to 
spend the night at her apartment so that she could assure that he 
went to a doctor’s appointment for his bone disease at a hospital 
across the street from the project.98 The Appellate Department, 
however, found the penalty of termination “shockingly 
disproportionate” in light of her twenty-one-year residency, her 
compelling explanation for allowing her son to stay only for one 
night and the fact that her son’s stay there did not compromise the 
health or safety of other tenants.99 
While one might argue these cases demonstrate that courts 
serve as an effective check on the often harsh decisions of housing 
authorities, one must consider the number of cases that are not 
appealed for lack of resources.100 In addition, courts often uphold 
evictions of innocent tenants even when they are challenged. In 
Syracuse Housing Authority v. Boule, for example, Ann Boule was 
evicted for the criminal activity of her baby sitter.101 Ms. Boule 
was on her way to work when her usual baby-sitter became 
unavailable.102 To avoid jeopardizing her employment, she called 
the child’s father at the last minute to baby-sit while she worked.103 
Unbeknownst to Ms. Boule, while she was at work, the father 
                                                          
97 764 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). In March 1997, her son moved 
out of the apartment as part of an earlier settlement agreement with the housing 
authority in connection with an eviction proceeding brought against the tenant 
for her son’s unlawful possession of marijuana. Matter of Robinson v. Finkel, 
Decision of Interest, 228 N.Y. L.J. 18 (2002). See supra Part III.C (explaining 
the policy of exclusion). 
98 Robinson, 764 N.Y.S.2d at 95-96. 
99 Id. 
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2003) (finding, in connection with the creation of 
the Legal Services Corporation, that “there is a need to provide high quality 
legal assistance to those who would be otherwise unable to afford adequate legal 
counsel and to continue the present vital legal services program”). 
101 Syracuse Hous. Auth. v. Boule, 701 N.Y.S.2d 541, 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1999). 
102 Syracuse Hous. Auth. v. Boule, 658 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (Syracuse City 
Ct. 1996), aff’d,3 676 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Onandaga County Ct. 1998), rev’d, 701 
N.Y.S.2d 541. 
103 Id. 
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invited two other people to the house where they sold drugs and 
were subsequently arrested.104 While the lower court held that 
evicting the mother, the tenant of record, was unwarranted since 
she was unaware of, did not consent to and could not foresee the 
criminal activity, the Appellate Division affirmed the eviction of 
Ms. Boule and applied a strict liability standard.105 The Appellate 
Division found the housing authority is not bound to exercise 
discretion or consider mitigating circumstances where there is a 
violation of section 1437d(l)(6).106 
Similarly, in San Francisco, a mother and father were evicted 
from their federally subsidized apartment for failure to ensure that 
no drug-related activity took place on the premises.107 During a 
routine search of their son’s jacket hanging in a closet, the police 
found four packets of narcotics.108 Despite no evidence that the 
parents knew of, controlled, acquiesced in or had reason to know 
of their son’s possession of narcotics in the apartment, the eviction 
was upheld.109 The court reasoned that the eviction was proper 
because the parents were not being evicted for the conduct of their 
son, but for their failure to fulfill their commitment in the lease to 
                                                          
104 Id. The court found: 
The following further facts are stipulated: respondent did not know Mr. 
Troutman had invited the other two persons upon the premises and she 
did not give permission for them to be present; none of the three 
persons arrested reside at the apartment; respondent was unaware of the 
presence or sale of the drugs on the premises; respondent was not in 
any way involved in the possession or sale of the drugs; respondent was 
not criminally charged regarding this incident; respondent believed that 
Mr. Troutman did not have a criminal record; and neither neighbors nor 
the Housing Authority notified respondent of the criminal activity 
during its occurrence. 
Id. 
105 See id. at 780 (applying a balancing approach at the trial level); but see 
Boule, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 542 (applying strict liability approach in the appellate 
division). 
106 Boule, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 542. 
107 San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 372 (Cal. 
App. Dept. 1995). 
108 Id. at 369. 
109 Id. at 369-70, 372. 
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ensure and prevent any drug activity from occurring on the 
premises.110 
III. IT’S JUST BAD PUBLIC POLICY 
The Provision implements poor public policy in several ways. 
First, the Provision puts tenants at risk by implying an affirmative 
duty on tenants to prevent and stop criminal behavior of third 
parties.111 Second, the Provision inhibits the recovery of tenants 
who are substance abusers by denying them one of the most 
fundamental components of recovery—family.112 Third, the 
provision breaks up families by conditioning their continued 
occupancy on permanently excluding the third party, who often is 
a family member.113 And finally, the Provision is unconscionable 
and renders the lease an unconscionable contract.114 
A.  The Provision Unfairly Imposes an Affirmative Duty on 
Public Housing Tenants to Prevent and Stop the 
Criminal Behavior of Third Parties 
While one may have a moral duty to prevent harm, the law 
distinguishes this from causing harm, punishing only the latter 
affirmative action.115 Generally, one is not liable for failing to 
act.116 Under the Provision, however, tenants are under an 
                                                          
110 Id. at 372 (holding “drug-related activity by any member of a tenant 
household is cause per se for termination of the lease where, as here, the housing 
authority receives federal funds”). 
111 See infra Part III.A. 
112 See infra Part III.B. 
113 See infra Part III.C. 
114 See infra Part III.D. 
115 See, e.g., Thomas Morawetz, Book Review, The Jurisprudence of Duty 
and Obedience, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1135 (1988). 
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (“The fact that the 
actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s 
aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such 
action.”); Id. at Illustration 1 (“A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street 
in front of an approaching automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a 
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affirmative obligation, subject to termination, to ensure no tenant, 
member of the household or guest under the tenant’s control 
engages in criminal activity.117 Courts have expressly upheld this 
duty of tenants to ensure that no other tenant or guest engages in a 
criminal drug activity.118 
This requirement is unfair because, as seen with the elderly and 
disabled plaintiffs in Rucker, not all residents are capable of 
ensuring that a member of the resident’s household, guest or other 
person does not engage in criminal activity.119 Moreover, it is poor 
                                                          
word or touch without delaying his own progress. A does not do so, and B is run 
over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent B from stepping into the street, and 
is not liable to B.”); see L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ind. 
1942) (“One is not bound to guard against a happening which there is no reason 
to anticipate or expect.”). 
117 See HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 
966.4(f) (2003). The lease shall provide that the tenant shall be obligated: 
(12)(i) To assure that no tenant, member of the tenant’s household, or 
guest engages in: (A) Any criminal activity that threatens the health, 
safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents; 
or (B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or off the premises; (ii) To 
assure that no other person under the tenant’s control engages in: (A) 
Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety or right to 
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents; or (B) Any 
drug-related criminal activity on the premises; (iii) To assure that no 
member of the household engages in an abuse or pattern of abuse of 
alcohol that affects the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of 
the premises by other residents. 
Id. This obligation is a great burden in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling that 
the phrase under control “means control in the sense that the tenant has 
permitted access to the premises.” See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 
535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002). 
118 See Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(“Embodied within this agreement is the understanding that it is the resident’s 
obligation to ensure that no member of the resident’s household, guest, or other 
person under the resident’s control shall engage in any criminal activity on THA 
premises.”); see also Remeeder H.D.F.C., Inc. v. Francis, No. 2000-1406 K C, 
slip op. at 1 (N.Y. App. Term Dec. 6, 2001) (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) 
(2003) with 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5) (2003) and concluding that “both versions 
of the federal statute seem to make tenants the guarantors of the conduct by 
other household members, guests, or other people under a tenant’s control”). 
119 Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d 
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public policy to expect a civilian to endanger himself by implying 
a duty to spot illegal drug activity and stop it.120 In fact, Congress 
has recognized this danger and protected against it in other 
contexts.121 Such impositions on people not qualified to fulfill 
these tasks will likely lead to incorrect reporting of crimes as well 
as potentially dangerous situations for the civilians involved.122 
                                                          
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (noting 
Pearlie Rucker was 63, Willie Lee, 71, Barbara Hill, 63, and Herman Walker, 75 
and disabled). See Stacy Finz, Evictions of Seniors Assailed in Court; One Strike 
Policy Called Racist, Classist, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 20, 2000, at A20 
(describing how Herman Walker, who is partially paralyzed, requires around the 
clock care); see also Part I.B.1 (discussing the plaintiffs in Rucker). 
120 See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134 (remarking “a tenant who ‘cannot control 
drug crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which threaten 
health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other residents and the 
project’”); see also Michael A. Cavanagh & M. Jason Williams, Low-Income 
Grandparents as the Newest Draftees in the Government’s War on Drugs: A 
Legal and Rhetorical Analysis of Department of Housing and Urban 
Development v. Rucker, 10 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 157 (2003). 
The Court’s reflection thus blames the victims. The full force of the 
United States government, consisting of the courts, the military, and the 
police, has been unable to stop drug crime for more than thirty 
years . . . . The Court simply fails to explain how poor elderly 
grandmothers and disabled persons are, single-handedly, to rid the 
PHAs of drug dealers. 
Id. at 164-65. 
121 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2003) (setting forth an innocent owner 
defense, the statute states: “A person is not required by this subparagraph to take 
steps that the person reasonably believes would be likely to subject any person 
(other than the person whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture) to physical 
danger”); see also William Raspberry, Clean Up Public Housing With One 
Strike, TIMES UNION, Apr. 1, 2002, at A9 (“A rule requiring eviction under any 
and every circumstance of family-member involvement with criminality would 
be just another example of ‘zero tolerance’ gone mad.”). 
122 See Cavanagh & Williams, supra note 120, at 165 (“The Court simply 
fails to explain how poor elderly grandmothers and disabled persons are, single-
handedly, to rid the PHAs of drug dealers.”); 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(B)(ii) 
(stating in connection with a civil forfeiture defense that “[a] person is not 
required . . . to take steps that the person reasonably believes would be likely to 
subject any person (other than the person whose conduct gave rise to the 
forfeiture) to physical danger”). 
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Nonetheless, the Chief Justice remarked that if a tenant cannot 
control the criminal activity of someone else, the tenant is a threat 
to the community, and the threat warrants eviction.123 According to 
this reasoning, a paralyzed minister is a threat to the community 
because he did not stop his caregiver, upon whom he was 
dependent, from storing drugs in his apartment.124 By the Court’s 
logic, it seems the only people who are truly “safe” enough to live 
in public housing are people with detective-like skills and the 
courage to confront criminals about their illegal behavior and 
subdue them when they pose a physical or criminal threat. 
Finally, a grandparent or parent should be entitled to the 
presumption that their children are not engaged in a criminal 
activity.125 It is unfair to hold someone liable for what amounts to 
                                                          
123 See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134. The Supreme Court reasoned: 
[T]here is an obvious reason why Congress would have permitted local 
public housing authorities to conduct no-fault evictions: Regardless of 
knowledge, a tenant who “cannot control drug crime, or other criminal 
activities by a household member which threaten health or safety of 
other residents, is a threat to other residents and the project.” 
Id. (quoting HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 56 Fed. Reg. 
51560, 51567 (Oct. 11, 1991)). In an apparent attempt to soften the harsh 
language, the Federal Register states that “If a tenant cannot control criminal 
activity by a household member, the tenant can request that the PHA remove the 
person from the lease as an authorized unit occupant, and may seek to bar access 
by that person to the unit.” 56 Fed. Reg. 51560. While this might work with 
someone who is not a member of the family or whom is not wanted on the 
premises, the idea that a family that desires to stay united should simply call the 
housing authorities to remove the offender, especially in the case of a low-level 
crime like smoking marijuana, is absurd. See supra note 50 and accompanying 
text (citing California statute classifying possession of marijuana as a 
misdemeanor and New York statute classifying it as a violation). Furthermore, 
even if the tenant calls upon the housing authority to remove the offender, the 
tenant may still be evicted. See supra note 51 (explaining that courts are not 
obligated to consider all circumstances relative to a particular eviction case, but 
may consider them in its discretion). 
124 See, e.g., Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131-33 (explaining that a tenant’s eviction 
may rest solely on his or her having provided an individual engaged in drug-
related activity with “access to the premises”). 
125 See Daniel E. Witte, Note, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to 
Recognizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 
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failing to report their son or daughter because they might be using 
drugs.126 Such a duty should not be imposed upon a familial 
relationship where trust is an essential component to the health of 
the relationship.127 
                                                          
BYU L. REV. 183, 221 (1996) (“In the realm of family law, the presumption 
‘that children ordinarily will be best cared for by those bound to them by the ties 
of nature’ serves a similar function as the presumption of ‘innocent until proven 
guilty’ . . . . Without such basic presuppositions, an existing orderly and secure 
society cannot long maintain itself.”) (citations omitted). 
126 See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117 (“Lee and Hill contend they had no prior 
knowledge of any illegal drug activity by their grandsons.”). Because plaintiff’s 
Barbara Hill and Willie Lee had no knowledge of their grandson’s marijuana use 
they had no reason to either report the situation to the housing authority or 
attempt to have them excluded from the household. See also HUD Public 
Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003) (“Exclusion 
of culpable household member. The PHA may require a tenant to exclude a 
household member in order to continue to reside in the assisted unit, where that 
household member has participated in or been culpable for action or failure to 
act that warrants termination.”). Nonetheless, it is clear that it would be to their 
advantage, insofar as being able to maintain their residences, to just report their 
grandsons because it is possible they may be using drugs. 
127 See Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 701 A.2d 370, 373 (Me. 1997) (“As a 
general rule, parent and child relationships are based on trust . . . .”); In re A. & 
M., 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). 
The role of the family, particularly that of the mother and father, in 
establishing a child’s emotional stability, character and self-image is 
universally recognized. The erosion of this influence would have a 
profound effect on the individual child and on society as a whole. Child 
psychologists and behavioral scientists generally agree that it is 
essential to the parent-child relationship that the lines of 
communication remain open and that the child be encouraged to “talk 
out” his problems. It is therefore critical to a child’s emotional 
development that he know that he may explore his problems in an 
atmosphere of trust and understanding without fear that his confidences 
will later be revealed to others. 
Id.; Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly A New Or 
Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 604 (1987) (“In order for 
parents to exercise their rights to raise their children and instill in them morals 
and values, society must encourage a mutual trust between parent and child.”); 
Michael D. Moberly, Children should be Seen and not Heard: Advocating the 
Recognition of a Parent-Child Privilege in Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 515, 532 
(2003) (“[T]he ability to provide effective parental guidance largely depends 
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B. The Provision Inhibits Recovery Where The Tenant Being 
Evicted Is Addicted To Illegal Drugs 
While the criminal activities at issue in Rucker, smoking 
marijuana and possession of cocaine, arguably present dangers to 
other tenants, the crimes are generally consequences of substance 
abuse.128 This addiction-driven behavior is not similar to “drug 
dealers . . . imposing a reign of terror on . . . housing tenants,”129 
and this difference is recognized in the way criminal courts have 
prosecuted these crimes.130 While drug abuse has largely been 
considered a criminal issue, it is now being considered and treated 
more consistently as a medical issue.131 Yet, the Provision, 
seemingly overlooking the medical aspects of drug abuse, still 
provides that tenants may be evicted for using or abusing drugs or 
having guests who do so.132 
                                                          
upon the existence of loyal and trusting family relationships.”); Jeff Murrah, 
Why Should I Trust You?, (“Trust is an essential part of family life. In . . . [the] 
parental relationships, there must be trust. Each person needs to be able to count 
on each other, and have that sense of safety that comes from trust within the 
home. When trust is established in families, everyone benefits.”), at 
http://www.myparentime.com/articles/ articleS43.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 
2003). 
128 See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 128. 
129 42 U.S.C. § 11901(3) (2003). 
130 Asa Hutchinson, Drug Policy In America—A Continuing Debate: An 
Effective Drug Policy To Protect America’s Youth And Communities, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441, 451-52 (2003) (“State criminal laws concerning drug 
possession focus on rehabilitative and restorative programs, rather than 
automatic incarceration for drug users.”). 
131 WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, Resolution Regarding Drug Abuse Policies in 
Washington State (advising that “‘low-level’ drug crimes, such as simple 
possession, should be approached as health problems not criminal problems”), 
http://www.kcba.org/drug_law/WSBA.pdf (Dec. 11, 2001). 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l) (2003) (“For purposes of [§ 1437d(l)(6)], the 
term ‘drug-related criminal activity’ means the illegal . . . use, or possession 
with intent to . . . use . . . a controlled substance.”); see also Rucker, 237 F.3d at 
1117 (eviction proceedings instituted against two tenants for smoking 
marijuana); HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 
966.4 (providing for the termination of a tenant’s lease for abusing alcohol 
where the “abuse or pattern of abuse . . . threatens the health, safety, or right to 
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Evictions conducted against substance abusers are 
unreasonably harsh because substance abusers need the stability of 
a home to recover—not homelessness.133 Addiction to mood 
altering substances such as alcohol or cocaine is a chronic disease 
classified with cancer, AIDS and other illnesses, which produce 
long-term physical, psychological and social damages.134 While 
there is no cure for addiction, it may be effectively treated through 
abstinence and sobriety.135 It is well accepted that a vital 
component to the addiction recovery process is communication.136 
One of the most effective forms of communication geared toward 
recovery involves the family.137 Yet, the strict and unforgiving 
parameters of the Provision do not allow one the proper means to 
recover. Because the Provision impresses an affirmative duty on a 
tenant of record to ferret out criminal activity, one who is suffering 
                                                          
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents”). 
133 See CONN. CLEARING HOUSE, WHEELER CLINIC, Facts About Drug and 
Alcohol Addiction, Treatment, Recovery, and Use (“Family and friends can play 
critical roles in motivating individuals with drug and alcohol problems to enter 
treatment, stay in it, and maintain sobriety. Family therapy is also important, 
especially for adolescents. Additional support is available through the recovery 
community in the form of 12-step programs.”), at http://www.ctclearinghouse. 
org/FactSheets/fs_treatment_facts_about.pdf (2001). 
134 TERENCE T. GORSKI & MERLENE MILLER, STAYING SOBER: A GUIDE 
FOR RELAPSE PREVENTION 39-40 (1986); see AMERICAN COUNCIL ON 
ALCOHOLISM, What is Alcoholism (defining alcoholism as a fatal addictive 
disease), at http://www.aca-usa.org/acadefinition.htm (page last updated July 23, 
2003). 
135 GORSKI & MILLER, supra note 134, at 50 (“Total abstinence is necessary 
to recover from an addiction . . . . Abstinence is a necessary first step for 
recovery.”). 
136 ANNE GELLER, M.D., RESTORE YOUR LIFE: A LIVING PLAN FOR SOBER 
PEOPLE 152 (1991). 
137 Id. at 152. See James Garrett, Judith Landau & Robert Shea, The ARISE 
Intervention: Using Family and Network Links to Engage Addicted Persons in 
Treatment, 15 J. OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 333, 333 (1998) (“The most 
well-known and widely applied [treatment alternative to self-help groups for 
substance abusers] is the ‘Intervention’ approach . . . [which] proceeds by 
enlisting and convening as many of a chemically dependent person’s (CDP’s) 
significant others as possible in an effort to induce the CDP to enter 
treatment.”). 
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from addiction or relapsing is unlikely to come forward and ask a 
family member or friend in the public housing project for help for 
fear of being reported and subsequently evicted.138 While recovery 
is most successful when it is discussed openly in the family unit, 
the Provision deprives families of the ability to openly address the 
use of illegal drugs because it creates the risk of eviction.139 Thus, 
substance abusers are deprived of the family as a valuable 
component of their recovery.140 
                                                          
138 See Platoni, supra note 30 (“As a matter of fact, [the Provision] puts 
tenants in a situation where they’re afraid to reveal any activity in their homes or 
address the issue because they know the moment they say anything, the housing 
authority could move to evict them.” (quoting Catherine Bishop of the Oakland-
based National Housing Law Project)). Relapse is typical during the recovery 
process and is in some ways to be expected. See also GORSKI & MILLER, supra 
note 134, at 112. 
139 See GELLER, supra note 136, at 152-55 (discussing how open lines of 
communication with family members contributes to the success of an 
individual’s recovery from alcohol and drugs). 
140 Indigent families often lack access to affordable health services as 
compared to wealthy families and thus are already at a disadvantage. See HENRY 
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, Key Facts (Jan. 2003), at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/ 
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14185 (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2003). 
Low-income Americans (those who earn less than 200% of the federal 
poverty level, or $28,256 for a family of three in 2001) run the highest 
risk of being uninsured. Over a third of the poor and more than a 
quarter of the near-poor lack coverage. The poor and the near-poor 
comprise two-thirds (66%) of the uninsured population. 
Id. That disadvantage is only amplified when these families are denied the most 
simple and basic means to assist in the rehabilitation of addicts within the 
family. A family that owns their home is able to recover as a family because 
they are not forced to choose between either excluding a family member to 
prevent eviction or including him to help him recover. The Provision and its 
rules apply only to individuals leasing public housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1437d(l)(6) (2003) (“Each pubic housing agency shall utilize leases . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). The lease Provision effectively denies this same benefit of 
recovering as a family to the poor who are only able to rent through public 
housing programs and cannot afford to own. This disparate treatment of families 
based on wealth and ownership of property is bad public policy. Compare 
plaintiff Rucker’s daughter and Florida Gov. Bush’s daughter: both residents of 
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C. The Provision Breaks Up Families Through Permanent 
Exclusion 
One of the more devastating effects of the Provision is that it 
divides and breaks up families. Tenants are sometimes given the 
option to exclude the offending person as a condition to their 
continued occupancy.141 This option effectively is a choice 
between losing your home or breaking up your family. This 
decision may not be a difficult choice where the individual you are 
agreeing to exclude is someone you do not want to visit your 
home. Such a decision, however, is extremely difficult when the 
person you are being asked to exclude is your child, spouse or 
caretaker; but, under the current policy, one who refuses to 
permanently exclude will likely be evicted.142 
Powell v. Franco illustrates how tenants are forced to choose 
                                                          
housing funded by taxpayers and both had problems with alcohol or drugs, but 
the disparate treatment—eviction for a poor elderly woman with no knowledge 
of her daughter’s drug use, versus medical treatment for a privileged young 
woman with a history of substance abuse and addiction. See Arianna 
Huffington, 1 Strike, You’re Out on the Street, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002, at B13. 
141 See HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 
966.4 (2003) (“Exclusion of culpable household member. The PHA may require 
a tenant to exclude a household member in order to continue to reside in the 
assisted unit, where that household member has participated in or been culpable 
for action or failure to act that warrants termination.”). 
142 See Featherstone v. Franco, 742 N.E.2d 607, 610 (N.Y. 2000) 
(terminating tenant’s lease when tenant “refused a possible mitigated sanction 
predicated upon [her 18 year old son’s] . . . permanent exclusion [from the 
apartment]”); Patrick v. Hernandez, 765 N.Y.S.2d 508, 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003) (affirming the housing authority’s termination of a tenant’s lease for 
violating, on at least one occasion, a stipulation to permanently exclude her son 
from the home); Holiday v. Franco, 709 N.Y.S.2d 523, 527 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2000) (annulling the housing authority’s termination of a tenant’s lease for 
violating a stipulation to exclude her son where the son came to the home on one 
occasion without the tenant’s knowledge and the tenant was in her late sixties, 
resided in New York City Housing Authority premises since 1957 with an 
unblemished record and her household included a disabled daughter); see also 
Robinson v. Martinez, 764 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (illustrating the 
difficulty with excluding a family member from one’s home). See supra text 
accompanying notes 97-99 (discussing the facts of Robinson v. Martinez). 
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between breaking up their family and most likely homelessness.143 
In Powell, New York’s Appellate Division reversed a 
determination by the housing authority that the tenants 
permanently exclude their son as a condition to remain in 
housing.144 The court held that conditioning the tenants’ continued 
occupancy upon permanently excluding their son was shocking to 
its sense of fairness where the son pled to disorderly conduct, 
performed five days of community service, the incident was 
isolated and the family was otherwise law-abiding and stable.145 
While some might argue it is drug use that breaks up families, it is 
also true that the recovery process can strengthen the family in 
many ways.146 Indeed, families fulfill a critical role for delinquent 
youths as systems of emotional support and models of appropriate 
behavior.147 Disrupting the family unit negatively impacts 
                                                          
143 684 N.Y.S.2d 226, 226 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding the housing 
authority “required the permanent exclusion of petitioners’ son, Kenneth, as a 
condition of their continued occupancy in public housing”). 
144 Id. In Powell, the tenants’ son was arrested after he was seen making 
several “hand-to-hand” exchanges with individuals and was found with what the 
arresting officer believed was crack cocaine. Id. 
145 Id. at 226-27. While the Appellate Division was able to protect the 
family in this instance, it is important to note that the case was nonetheless 
brought against the indigent family. In this case, the family was fortunate to 
secure representation, yet many poor families are unable to afford representation 
in civil cases, and thus, are unlikely to challenge such inappropriate applications 
of permanent exclusion. See Di Angelo v. Illinois Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 891 F.2d 
1260, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right 
to counsel at the expense of another—whether of the adversary or of the private 
bar.”). On one hand, it makes sense to have public housing managers 
responsible for recommending eviction in that they are on site everyday and are 
in touch with the severity of the problems that exist. On the other hand it places 
a great deal of power and responsibility in the hands of a group of people 
responsible for managing buildings who are not necessarily capable of making 
difficult and sensitive decisions regarding crime, the elderly and families. While 
the courts can serve as a check on potential abuses, this is only effective if the 
people can afford to utilize the courts. This is uncertain where people are 
indigent. 
146 GELLER, supra note 136, at 164-65. 
147 Debra A. Madden-Derdich, Stacie A. Leonard & Gordon A. Gunnel, 
Parents’ and Children’s Perceptions of Family Processes in Inner-City Families 
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delinquent behavior.148 
D. The Provision Is Unconscionable Rendering the Lease an 
Unconscionable Contract 
The Court has characterized the government’s role in 
connection with public housing “as a landlord of property that it 
owns, invoking a clause in a lease to which respondents have 
agreed and which Congress has expressly required.”149 This 
characterization, however, is over-simplified and inaccurate. The 
government is not simply a landlord,150 and the tenants had 
                                                          
with Delinquent Youths: A Qualitative Investigation, 28 J. MARITAL & FAM. 
THERAPY 355, 356 (2002). 
148 Id. (findings supported previous empirical research highlighting the 
importance of family interaction processes in the lives of delinquent youths). See 
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, Risk Factors for Delinquency: An Overview, 
(“Family characteristics such as poor parenting skills, family size, home discord, 
child maltreatment, and antisocial parents are risk factors linked to juvenile 
delinquency.”), at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/jjjournal_2003_2/ page3.html 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2003). 
149 Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134-35 (2002) 
(finding “‘no-fault’ eviction is a common ‘incident of tenant responsibility under 
normal landlord-tenant law and practice’”) (citation omitted); see Hous. Auth. v. 
Chapman, 780 N.E.2d 1106 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding that a tenant assumed 
the obligations of a valid contract in signing a lease for public housing); HUD 
Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 56 Fed. Reg. 51560, 51567 
(Oct. 11, 1991) (“As in a conventional tenancy, a public housing tenant holds 
tenure of the unit subject to the requirements of the lease . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
150 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(A) (2003) (“It is the policy of the United 
States . . . to promote the general welfare of the Nation . . . as provided in this 
Act . . . to assist States and political subdivisions of States to remedy the unsafe 
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent and safe dwellings for low-
income families.”). Unlike a landlord in a simple lease assignment who enters 
into agreements with the expectation of profits, the government did not create 
public housing to generate income. See U.S DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
What is Public Housing (“Public housing was established to provide decent and 
safe rental housing for eligible low-income families, the elderly, and persons 
with disabilities.”), at http://www.hud.gov/renting/ phprog.cfm (last updated 
Dec. 5, 2000). 
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virtually no choice but to agree to the contracts’ terms.151 In light 
of the tenants’ absence of choice and the leases’ grossly 
unfavorable terms, the Court is arguably enforcing unconscionable 
contracts.152 
                                                          
151 See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), 
rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) 
(“There is certainly no bargained-for-exchange in public housing leases. The 
form of public housing leases is almost entirely dictated by HUD.”); see also 
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327 (1942) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter stated: 
“[] [I]f one party has the power of saying to the other, ‘that which you 
require shall not be done except upon the conditions which I choose to 
impose,’ no person can contend that they stand upon anything like an 
equal footing.” . . . The fundamental principle of law that the courts 
will not enforce a bargain where one party has unconscionably taken 
advantage of the necessities and distress of the other has found 
expression in an almost infinite variety of cases. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
152 “Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence 
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract 
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Generally, the 
unconscionable contract requires inequality “so strong and manifest as to shock 
the conscience and confound the judgment of any (person) of common sense.” 
See Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977) (quoting Mandel v. 
Liebman, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152 (N.Y. 1951)). Courts have utilized the language 
of unconscionable contacts when they have been confronted with strict liability 
evictions. See Holiday v. Franco, 709 N.Y.S.2d 523, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) 
(finding tenants expulsion from her home “shocking to the conscience” where 
her excluded son was found in her apartment on a single occasion and the tenant 
was a longtime tenant, cared for her disabled daughter and had an unblemished 
record as a tenant); Spand v. Franco, 663 N.Y.S.2d 813, 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1997) (holding eviction of petitioner was “shocking to one’s sense of fairness” 
where petitioner was involved in one isolated incident, had no other violations 
and there was no indication that she posed any risk to other tenants or property); 
Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 464 S.E.2d 68, 72-73 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that to evict the tenant and her daughters “with no evidence of fault on 
their part for the shooting would . . . indeed shock our sense of fairness”); 
Brown v. Popolizio, 569 N.Y.S.2d 615, 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“It would 
be shocking to one’s sense of fairness to terminate the tenancies of persons who 
have not committed ‘nondesirable acts’ and have not had control over those who 
have committed such acts.”); New York City Hous. Auth. v. Watson, 207 
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Standards developed in the common law doctrine of 
unconscionability generally govern whether a clause in a real 
estate lease is unconscionable.153 Courts generally do not enforce 
unconscionable contracts.154 A contract is unconscionable where 
there is both procedural and substantive inequality.155 The key 
components rendering the clause or the entirety of a contract 
unconscionable are, first, lack of meaningful choice and, second, 
unreasonably favorable terms to the party seeking enforcement.156 
                                                          
N.Y.S.2d 920, 924 (App. Term 1960) (Hofstadter, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
affirming the housing authority’s eviction of a family based solely on the 
criminal activity of the father when the father was incarcerated “shocks the 
conscience”). Thus, it can be fairly said that courts have brought the common 
law doctrine of unconscionability to bear on the issue of no fault evictions. 
153 Halprin v. 2 Fifth Ave. Co., 422 N.Y.S.2d 275, 279 (N.Y. County 
Super. Ct. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 427 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1980), aff’d, 434 N.E.2d 244 (N.Y. 1982). 
154 See Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. 443, 445 (1870) (“If a contract be 
unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will give 
to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but only 
such as he is equitably entitled to.”). See also Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. at 
326 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
Does any principle in our law have more universal application than the 
doctrine that courts will not enforce transactions in which the relative 
positions of the parties are such that one has unconscionably taken 
advantage of the necessities of the other? . . . Fraud and physical duress 
are not the only grounds upon which courts refuse to enforce 
contracts . . . . More specifically, the courts generally refuse to lend 
themselves to the enforcement of a ‘bargain’ in which one party has 
unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of the other . . . . 
The fundamental principle of law that the courts will not enforce a 
bargain where one party has unconscionably taken advantage of the 
necessities and distress of the other has found expression in an almost 
infinite variety of cases. 
Id. at 326-28. 
155 See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449; see also Sablosky v. Gordon Co., 535 
N.E.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. 1989) (explaining that an unconscionable contract is a 
contract where both substantive and procedural unfairness exist); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
156 See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449 (“Unconscionability has generally been 
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the 
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the 
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In determining whether meaningful choice exists, one must 
consider the totality of the transaction, and if there is a gross 
inequality of bargaining power, meaningful choice is not 
present.157 
Meaningful choice implies an alternative—a decision after 
considering more than one option.158 Yet, public housing tenants 
are essentially presented with two options: the Provision in the 
lease, or, if they choose not to sign the lease, homelessness, which 
is no option.159 The procedural inequality is also manifest in the 
circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract, including 
the circumstances of the parties at the signing of the contract.160 
People can wait up to ten years for public housing.161 And wait 
                                                          
other party.”). 
157 See id. (stating the unreasonableness or unfairness of the terms of the 
contract must be considered in light of the circumstances that existed when the 
contract was made); see also Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 
1977) (noting that an unconscionable contract has been described as one where 
“‘no (person) in his (or her) senses and not under delusion would make on the 
one hand, and as no honest and fair (person) would accept on the other’” 
(quoting Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889))). 
158 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 258 (4th ed. 1999). 
159 See Weidman v. Tomaselli, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 687 (Rockland County 
Ct. 1975), aff’d, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (App. Term 1975) (“The Court takes judicial 
notice that food, clothing, shelter, and employment are necessities of life. The 
respondents must seek and obtain housing for themselves and for their infant 
daughter. The respondents do not have the alternative of foregoing shelter, nor is 
any natural shelter, such as a cave, available to them.”); see also Featherstone v. 
Franco, 703 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (App. Div. 2000) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (finding 
“public housing is a last resort for many of its residents”), aff’d, 742 N.E.2d 607 
(N.Y. 2000). 
160 See Villa Milano Homeowners Ass’n v. Il. Davorge, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
1, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that procedural inequality analysis in an 
unconscionable contract focuses on oppression which is found where there is 
“an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker 
party”). 
161 See U.S. MAYOR’S HOUSING FACT SHEET, supra note 10, at 2 (finding 
families in some large cities wait ten years or more for an available unit of 
public housing); Kathleen McGowan, Nation’s Poorest Wait (and Wait) for 
Housing Help (finding the typical wait for public housing in New York City can 
be up to eight years), at http://www.tenant.net/Tengroup/Metcounc/Apr99 
/poorest.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). 
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they must for there is a serious lack of affordable housing 
alternatives.162 Under such conditions the sharp imbalance between 
the bargaining power of the waiting tenant and that of housing 
authority is exacerbated—the longer the wait, the greater the 
desperation and the weaker the bargaining strength of the tenant.163 
Further, the tenants are neither able to bargain out the harsh 
Provision, nor are they likely to be in a position to rent on the 
private market.164 Finally, the lease is virtually entirely dictated by 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development.165 These 
factors, when considered as a whole, demonstrate a lack of 
meaningful choice that significantly contributes to the procedural 
unfairness.166 
                                                          
162 See U.S. MAYOR’S HOUSING FACT SHEET, supra note 10, at 2 (noting 
how public housing and subsidized apartments fall far short of the need and 
waiting lists for public housing have grown to about 1 million households); 
NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, The Affordable Housing Crisis and 
Homelessness in New York City, The Problem and the Solutions (“According to 
Census Bureau statistics, in 1999 there was shortage of nearly 390,000 
affordable apartments for extremely-low-income renter household in New York 
City (i.e., households earning less than $16,100 per year). In contrast, in 1970 
there was actually a surplus of more than 270,000 affordable apartments for 
extremely-low-income renters.”), at http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/ 
home/downloads/nychousing01.pdf (updated Sept. 2002). 
163 See supra note 161 and infra note 166. 
164 See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128-29 
(2002) (finding HUD regulations administering § 1437d(l)(6) “require lease 
terms authorizing evictions” even where the tenant had no knowledge of the 
criminal activity); see also U.S. MAYOR’S HOUSING FACT SHEET, supra note 10 
(noting the widening public housing gap between supply and demand and that 
no significant new public housing has been built in the past twenty-five years); 
id. (“Almost 2 million low- and moderate- income working families pay more 
than half of their income on rent or live in severely inadequate housing.”). 
165 Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d 
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (finding 
that there is “no bargained-for-exchange in public housing leases” . . . and 
“public housing leases [are] almost entirely dictated by HUD”). 
166 See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter stated: 
[T]he courts generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of a 
“bargain” in which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the 
SAGHIR1.DOC 3/3/2004  1:52 PM 
410 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
The unfavorable terms of the public housing lease are manifest 
in the fact that it allows tenants to be evicted not for their own 
criminal acts, but instead, for the criminal acts of third parties.167 
The unreasonable terms are hardly more apparent than in Rucker, 
where, despite efforts by the plaintiffs to prevent criminal activity, 
eviction proceedings were still pursued by the local housing 
authority.168 In light of the advanced age of the people evicted and 
that the tenants had neither participated in nor committed criminal 
activity, the Provision’s effect shocks the conscience.169 It is 
                                                          
economic necessities of the other. “And there is great reason and justice 
in this rule, for necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, 
to answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty 
may impose upon them.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
167 Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1124 (“HUD conceded at oral argument that there 
was nothing more Pearlie Rucker could have done to protect herself from 
eviction, but argued that the statute authorized her eviction nonetheless.”). See 
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 466 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Fundamental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people.”). 
168 See Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at 
*5-8 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended 
by 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (finding Ms. Rucker regularly 
searched her daughter’s room for evidence of drug and alcohol activity; Ms. Hill 
and Ms. Lee were not alleged to have knowledge of their grandsons’ marijuana 
use and in fact warned them that such conduct could result in eviction); see also 
Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117 (Mr. Walker fired his caregiver, upon whom he was 
dependent, short after receiving an eviction notice). Admittedly, the housing 
authorities are not required to evict tenants and “may consider all circumstances 
relevant to a particular case,” HUD Public Housing Lease and Grievance 
Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003), however, this discretion may create a 
greater level of insecurity in that the tenants may be subject to the whims of the 
housing authority. See supra note 51 (discussing how housing authorities are not 
required to consider mitigating factors before evicting, but may do so in their 
discretion). 
169 See supra note 152 (citing courts that have utilized the phrase, “shocks 
the conscience,” in connection with no-fault evictions). The shocking effect of 
the provision is illustrated by the eviction proceedings instituted against Mr. 
Walker who was elderly, partially paralyzed and a former minister. Cruz Lat, 
supra note 33 (describing Mr. Walker as a “former minister, . . . 75, partially 
paralyzed in his left arm, and suffer[ing] from severe arthritis”). Nonetheless, he 
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unlikely that the majority of law abiding public housing tenants or 
fair-minded citizens find such evictions reasonable—especially 
where the innocent tenant is elderly or infirm and has been a good 
tenant for over twenty years.170 The Provision contained in the 
lease is an example of poor public policy.171 
                                                          
apparently constituted a threat to the community and needed to be removed just 
like the drug dealers. Jim Herron Zamora, ‘One Strike’ Tenants Keep 
Apartments in Oakland; 3 of 4 Evictions Dropped Although Law Upheld, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 5, 2002, at A21 (Joe Gresley, executive director of the 
Oakland Housing Authority stated: “Mr. Walker’s continued occupancy of an 
apartment in a building housing other seniors poses a threat to other residents of 
the building.”). 
170 See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1126; Brown v. Popolizio, 569 N.Y.S.2d 615, 
622-23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“It would be shocking to one’s sense of fairness 
to terminate the tenancies of persons who have not committed ‘nondesirable 
acts’ and have not had control over those who have committed such acts.”); see 
also Emelyn Cruz Lat, Oakland Tenants Sue Over 1 Strike Eviction Policy, SAN 
FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Mar. 4, 1998, at A-9 (“At a gut level it strikes you as 
incredibly unconscionable to throw seniors out on the street who had been good 
tenants for a long period of time for something they had no knowledge of or 
participation in.” (quoting Anne Tamiko Omura, of the Eviction Defense 
Center)). 
171 Additionally, it may be argued that the leases the tenants are entering 
into are nothing more than oppressive and unfair contracts of adhesion. CORBIN 
ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (noting that contracts of adhesion are part of our society to 
be neither condemned nor praised but analyzed and that courts are to protect the 
adhering party from oppression by a stronger party). While contracts of adhesion 
are necessary in our society and play an important role in minimizing transaction 
costs, by their nature they are created with the most favorable possible terms to 
the party offering the form. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4. In Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), the plaintiff bought a car 
through a standardized purchase agreement and the steering broke; however, the 
defendant car dealer disclaimed all warranties—implied and express. Id. at 80. 
The court held the disclaimer void. Id. at 95. Signing a contract without reading 
it is done at one’s own risk. But where the loss of important rights are involved, 
there are overriding public policy considerations that protect ordinary people 
from loss of those rights. Id. at 92. In Henningsen, an inequality in bargaining 
power between the “Big Three” automakers and car buyers created a lack of 
competition leaving the buyer without meaningful choice or alternative options. 
Id. at 87. The court found that “the disclaimer of an implied warranty of 
merchantability by the dealer, as well as the attempted elimination of all 
obligations other than replacement of defective parts, are violative of public 
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IV. FINDING AN ALTERNATIVE 
The individual rights of tenants appears to be an afterthought in 
Congress’ enactment of the Provision and the Court’s subsequent 
interpretation in Rucker.172 A better policy, however, is one that 
will protect the leasehold interest of the innocent public housing 
tenant and assure them that so long as they live within the law, 
they will be safe in their homes from both criminals and the 
government.173 Because the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue 
of knowledge, the following suggestions are necessarily directed 
toward Congress.174 
A.  No Strict Liability Requirement in Leases 
Congress should eliminate the strict liability requirement in the 
leases each tenant signs.175 Congress could do this in one of two 
ways: by writing a knowledge requirement into the statute or by 
enacting a provision expressly providing an innocent lessee 
exemption.176 The innocent lessee exemption could mirror the 
                                                          
policy and void.” Id. at 97. Similarly, it is contrary to public policy to have 
people sign leases allowing them to be evicted for the criminal act of another 
when they are presented with no other realistic options. It could be seen as 
oppressive and unfair to say to a desperate and indigent person: “Here is the 
lease—take it or leave it” knowing full well they have no option but to take it, 
and with it, the unreasonable Provision. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 
159-66 (discussing the lack of meaningful choice for tenants). 
172 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2003); Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. 
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
173 88-09 Realty LLC v. Hill, 737 N.Y.S.2d 227, 231 (N.Y. App. Term 
2001) (Patterson, J., dissenting) (affirming the important objective of combating 
the drug crisis, but recognizing that “[i]t can and should be accomplished . . . 
without the need to dispossess a tenant who is wholly unconnected to any illegal 
activities”). 
174 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130. 
175 See § 1437d(l)(6). “[A]ny criminal activity . . . engaged in by a public 
housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other 
person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” Id. 
176 Such a requirement would be similar to New York’s knowledge or 
acquiescence requirement, see infra note 181, or New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction 
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innocent owner defense set forth in the Controlled Substances 
Act.177 Pursuant to the exemption, a tenant would not be evicted 
where he did not know of the conduct or was aware of it and did 
all that could reasonably have been expected to stop the activity.178 
An innocent lessee exemption surely would have protected Pearlie 
Rucker who, at sixty-three, took affirmative steps to prevent 
criminal activity by searching her daughter’s room for any possible 
contraband.179 It also would have protected Mr. Walker, who fired 
his aide.180 A knowledge requirement could be similar to the 
knowledge or acquiescence requirement which has been utilized by 
New York courts.181 Pursuant to the requirement, a tenant would 
not be evicted unless they knew of or acquiesced in the criminal 
conduct.182 Such a requirement would have protected Ms. Hill and 
                                                          
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1-61.12 (West 2003). That statute permits 
eviction of a tenant or lessee who “knowingly harbors or harbored [in the leased 
premises] a person who committed [a drug offense], or otherwise permits or 
permitted such a person to occupy those premises for residential purposes, 
whether continuously or intermittently.” Id. at § 2A:18-61.1(p). 
177 See supra notes 38-39 (discussing the innocent owner defense in the 
Controlled Substances Act). 
178 Id. 
179 Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev’d 
sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) 
(“Rucker asserts that she regularly searches her daughter’s room for evidence of 
alcohol and drug use and has never found any evidence or observed any sign of 
drug use by her daughter.”). 
180 Bob Egelko, HUD’s Drug Rule Overturned; Appeals Court Says One 
Strike Rule Evicts Tenants Unfairly, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 25, 2001, at 
A6 (reporting how Herman Walker fired his caretaker as soon as he could find a 
replacement, as he needed around the clock care). 
181 See Remeeder H.D.F.C., Inc. v. Francis, No. 2000-1406 K C, slip op. at 
5 (N.Y. App. Term Dec. 6, 2001) (Patterson, J., dissenting) (“in order to 
demonstrate ‘use’ of the premises for illegal purposes . . . a tenant must have 
knowledge of and acquiesce to the use of the demised premises for such an 
illegal activity” (quoting Clifton Ct. v. Williams, N.Y. L.J., May 27, 1998, at 
28)); 220 W. 42 Assocs. v. Cohen, 302 N.Y.S.2d 494, 498 (N.Y. App. Term 
1969) (“In the case of the tenant the illegal acts must be established by landlord, 
which must also show either participation or acquiescence by the tenant.”). 
182 See 220 W. 42 Assocs., 302 N.Y.S.2d at 498. 
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Ms. Lee who did not know of their grandsons’ drug use.183 
Although strict liability eases enforcement and saves the cost 
of trying each case individually, it threatens all tenants, even those 
who take action to eradicate the possibility of wrongdoing.184 The 
innocent tenant is the one who suffers most directly by the strict 
liability standard. All of the tenants in Rucker, it can be argued, 
were exemplary tenants in that they did not look the other way, but 
took action.185 Nevertheless, under the strict liability standard, this 
does not amount to much, and in all of their cases eviction 
proceedings were brought against them.186 
B.  Provide Legal Services 
While the strict liability standard may be easily remedied 
through Congressional action, public housing tenants are not a 
group exercising much political clout, so the realistic possibility of 
Congress actually responding may be remote.187 In light of this, the 
local housing authorities, which have discretion to bring eviction 
proceedings, are urged to ensure that housing managers and 
housing court judges are properly trained to administer the laws 
                                                          
183 Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. June 24, 1998), vacated, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000), amended by 
237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
184 See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002) 
(“Strict liability maximizes deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties.”). 
185 See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the plaintiffs in Rucker). 
186 See Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345. 
187 See Richard H. McAdams, New and Critical Approaches to Law and 
Economics (Part II) Norms Theory: An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 
OR. L. REV. 339, 360-61(2000) (discussing public choice theory and “rent-
seeking” where “lobbying groups influence legislators with campaign 
contributions and other favors”); see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role In 
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 561 (2000) (“Public choice theory 
understands administrative decisions as the product of interest group pressure 
brought to bear on bureaucrats seeking rewards such as job security, enhanced 
authority, or the favor of powerful legislators upon whom the agency 
depends.”). 
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justly by requiring them to consider mitigating circumstances.188 
Few decisions can be truly just and fair where the tenant being 
evicted lacks the resources to challenge the eviction. One of the 
surest ways to prevent these often-unjust evictions and lend them a 
degree of legitimacy is to provide the indigent tenants with legal 
services, which are often lacking in civil matters.189 While this 
would increase the administrative burden, it is a burden we ought 
to bear in light of the seriousness of the issue—homelessness.190 
In Brown v. Popolizio, for instance, Cozyella Coe, an innocent 
tenant, had termination proceedings brought against her when her 
twenty-year-old son was arrested on project grounds for unlawfully 
possessing cocaine with intent to sell.191 Ms. Coe contacted a legal 
services organization to represent her, but they were unable to do 
so, and after one adjournment, the judge decided to go forward 
with the case.192 Ms. Coe did not object to any of the testimony, 
                                                          
188 By justly, I mean carefully applying the factors set forth in 24 C.F.R. § 
966.4 (2003). Those factors are: 
PHA termination of tenancy for criminal activity or alcohol abuse . . . . 
Consideration of circumstances. In a manner consistent with such 
policies, procedures and practices, the PHA may consider all 
circumstances relevant to a particular case such as the seriousness of 
the offending action, the extent of participation by the leaseholder in 
the offending action, the effects that the eviction would have on family 
members not involved in the offending activity and the extent to which 
the leaseholder has shown personal responsibility and has taken all 
reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the offending action. 
Id. 
189 Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and 
Directions for the Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215, 1254-55 (2003) 
(arguing that legal advocacy can help prevent homelessness resulting from 
eviction proceedings brought in housing court’s across the country, and that 
while the landlords have legal representation, the majority of tenants do not). 
190 See supra notes 10, 161, & 164 (discussing the shortage of affordable 
housing). 
191 569 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617-19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
192 Id. at 618. After receiving the termination notice, Ms. Coe contacted a 
community legal services organization, however they were unable to assist her 
because they were understaffed. Id. at 617. The matter was adjourned and the 
organization later took her case, however the volunteer attorney was unable to 
prepare for the case due to her inexperience and limited schedule. Id. at 617-18. 
SAGHIR1.DOC 3/3/2004  1:52 PM 
416 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
nor did she cross-examine witnesses, present witnesses, testify on 
her own behalf or present a closing argument.193 Nonetheless, the 
hearing officer recommended termination of tenancy.194 On appeal, 
the appellate division held the housing authority’s imposition of 
the maximum penalty, eviction, to be excessive.195 This result 
demonstrates that pursuing such senseless evictions is a waste of 
judicial resources and is disruptive to the family by putting it in 
serious jeopardy of becoming homeless. 
C.  Institute Second-Chance Policy 
While evicting only the criminal actor may be better than 
evicting the whole family, even evicting the actor when he engages 
in low-level criminal activity splits the family unit.196 The break-up 
of the family may be a factor in furthering criminal activity and 
may perpetuate the cycle of violence in the public housing 
communities.197 A more sensible approach that would still allow 
the housing authorities to take action to protect residents and at the 
same time preserve the family unit would be a second chance 
policy when non-violent crimes are at issue. The focus would be 
more on rehabilitation and less on punishment. Again, while this 
may create more of an administrative burden and increased costs, 
they are costs that should be borne in order to enhance the stability 
of families, which will in turn benefit communities by reducing the 
                                                          
Counsel for the housing authority refused to consent to another adjournment and 
the matter proceeded despite Ms. Coe’s lack of counsel and inability to represent 
herself. Id. at 618. When asked if she was prepared to represent herself Ms. Coe 
said “no” but the Hearing Officer proceeded in any event because she was 
unable to suggest a way she might obtain an attorney. Id. 
193 Id. at 618. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 621-22. 
196 See supra Part III.C (discussing the policy of permanent exclusion as a 
condition to continued occupancy). 
197 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, Profile of Jail Inmates 1996 (reporting 6 in 10 inmates grew up in 
homes without both parents), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pji96.pdf 
(revised June 4, 1998). 
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likelihood of criminal activity occurring.198 
For example, if someone is caught using drugs the offender 
should have the option to participate in a state mandated program 
of rehabilitation or job training—a tactic similarly employed by 
community courts.199 The court could focus on whether the tenant 
is complying as a measure of whether the tenant should be entitled 
                                                          
198 Preventing Youth Violence And Crime: The Role of Families, School 
and Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth and 
Families of the Comm. on Education and The Workforce, 106th Cong. 106-54 
(1999) (statement of Dr. Darnell Jackson, Director, Office of Drug Control 
Policy, Michigan Department of Community Health), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/edu/hedcew6-54.000/hedcew6-54.htm 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2003). Dr. Jackson stated: 
I think we need a clearer recognition that government alone cannot 
possibly be a surrogate parent for every troubled youth. Nothing can 
replace the role of communities, churches, faith, and family. Not 
surprisingly, a University of Maryland study released last month 
confirms children of parents who keep close tabs on their whereabouts 
and have knowledge of who their friends are, are less likely to use 
alcohol, get involved in drug usage, and more likely to be peer leaders 
in their groups; so clearly the most important role in deterring antisocial 
behavior of youth is with the parents. 
Id.; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, Best Practices of Youth 
Violence Prevention: A Sourcebook for Community Action 41 (“Parents’ 
interactions with each other, their behavior toward their children, and their 
emotional state have been shown to be important predictors of children’s violent 
behavior . . . . Marital conflict and a lack of communication between parents 
have also been identified as risk factors for youth violence.”), at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/dvp/bestpractices /chapter2a.pdf (revised June 2002). 
199 See CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, Demonstration Projects Midtown 
Community Court, at http://www.courtinnovation.org/demo_01mcc.html (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2003). 
Midtown Community Court sentences low-level offenders to pay back 
the neighborhood through community service while at the same time 
offering them help with problems that often underlie criminal behavior. 
Residents, businesses and social service agencies collaborate with the 
Court by supervising community service projects and by providing on-
site social services, including drug treatment, health care and job 
training. 
Id. 
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to continued occupancy of the premises. If it is shown that the 
tenant is not complying with the program or is repeatedly 
offending, then the privilege of opting to participate in the program 
can be revoked and eviction proceedings instituted. If the offense 
involves the selling of narcotics on housing grounds, the court 
should give the tenant one chance, but also sentence the tenant and 
require community service to be performed inside the housing 
community. 
D. Community Based Crime Reduction and Prevention 
Strategies 
A final suggestion is merely to encourage public housing 
authorities to continue community-based crime reduction and 
prevention strategies that have already significantly reduced crime 
in housing communities.200 Among the effective strategies 
employed by housing authorities which experienced declining 
crime rates were partnerships with the police department to 
provide additional security and investigative services in targeted 
communities, a community policing program utilizing foot patrols, 
crime prevention demonstrations and screening of new applicants’ 
backgrounds.201 In light of the success of these alternative 
strategies employed to reduce crime, there is not a need for the 
strict no-fault eviction policy of section 1437d(l)(6). These 
methods of crime prevention demonstrate that safety can be 
achieved without innocent tenants forfeiting the security of their 
home. 
CONCLUSION 
While the government has taken steps to protect tenants living 
in public housing, the policy of strict liability negatively affects 
                                                          
200 IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 8, at 10. In Birmingham, Alabama, 
assaults in public housing developments fell 27 percent, from 533 in 1992 to 389 
in 1996. Id. Similarly, in Forth Worth, Texas, violent crime in public housing 
was reduced by 37 percent, from 536 in 1993 to 340 in 1997. Id. at 11. 
201 IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 8, at 10-11. 
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law-abiding tenants by subjecting them to eviction. Where housing 
is scarce, as it is in many of our large urban centers, subjecting 
these innocent and often elderly tenants to homelessness is as big a 
threat as any drug dealer. Congress is unlikely to rewrite the 
Provision soon in light of the lack of political clout public housing 
residents possess due to their minority and poor status.202 Thus, the 
burden is upon the local housing authorities to exercise care and 
discretion in handling eviction proceedings. Housing authorities 
have a duty to ensure that families and elderly persons are not 
displaced for the actions of third parties, over which they had no 
control. We need not choose between protecting the individual 
rights of tenants and ensuring their safety. 
 
                                                          
202 See supra note 187 (discussing public choice theory). 
